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Japan's traditional post war policies are becoming in-
creasingly more autonomous from those of the U.S., despite
the fact that her defense policy remains linked to the U.S. -
Japan Security Treaty. The alternatives open to Japan are
diverse, each v/ith a v/ide range of effects, but the validity
of the U.S. committment will be the chief determinant of the
option selected. Nearly every element of Japan's post war
policies has been dictated by the need to guarantee her econ-
omic viability. Her post-war defense posture, despite inter-
nal and external pressures, has been predicated upon a policy
of absolute m.inimium defense. A major factor in Japan's move
towards independence is her new relations with the Asian
nations, specifically, the PRC and the USSR and the countries
she considers to be primary threats to her security - Korea
and TaiV'/an. Japan's future policy alteirnatives encompass a
wide range of options, each dependent u.pon a given set of
circumstances or events which could conceivably make any
one policy choice inevitable.
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In the next two decades, certain political
and security goals will continue to bind to-
gether Japan and the U.S. ... But autonomy
and independent policy - which Americans
profess to v/ant for the Japanese - gain
meaning and conviction as they are exercised




The end of World War II marked the beginning of a rela-
tionship between the United States and Japan somewhat unique
in the history of international politics. For the past thirty
years, nearly the whole of Japan's foreign policy has con-
sisted of echoing the political, economic and international
policies of Washington. Recent years, however, have produced
events indicative of substantial change in Japan's traditional
alliance with the United States. Vietnam, detente, the Sino-
Soviet conflict, the "Nixon shocks", and the oil crises have
caused Japan to re-evaluate both her dependency upon the
United States and her own potential as a world leader.
These changes are diverse and complex and reflect a
trend toward a new foreign policy for Japan, marked by a
greater integration into the Asian community and a defini-
tive move towards greater autonomy from the United States.
Since, from the viewpoint of the United States, Japan
has traditionally been considered essential to the defense
of American interests in East Asia, the problem, as

originally hypothesized, was that a substantial shift in
Japanese foreign and defense policy would have the potential
of altering the extent and the nature of U.S. defense committ-
ments in the Far East. However, since completion of the
research, the author was forced to arrive at a conclusion
completely the opposite of the original hypothesis, namely
that Japanese foreign and defense policies in the 1980 's will
not affect the U.S. committment, but will be directly affected
by the continued viability of that comrnittmient
.
The sources utilized were generally confined to those
appearing over the course of the last five years and con-
sisted of books, monographs, technical reports, scholarly
journals, government sponsored research projects, transla-
tions of the Japanese press and personal interviews.
A plethora of information \-7as obtained generally falling
into two basic schools of thought. One, as epitomized by
former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin 0. Reischauer, is of
the firm conviction that Japan is drifting away from her
post-war paternal-filial relationship with the United States.
However, they also believe that she cannot, at least for the
near future, continue as a viable power without the main-
tenance of U.S. military and economic guarantees. The second
school is most aptly represented by Albert Axelbank, and
believes that the pre-war hyperbolic nationalism of Japan
will manifest itself again. This school exhibits the belief
that Japan has both the capability and the national will to

"make it on her own" and become a military global power as
well as an economic one.
The content of this thesis is divided into four major
chapters. The following chapter is an examination of the
role of economics and trade as the traditional focal point
of post-war Japanese foreign and domestic policies. Also
explored is Japan's absolute reliance upon open access to
sources of energy and resource supplies. In addition, her
new interest in the potential of the lesser developed nations
of Asia and the Middle East is discussed. Chapter III
examines the military role in Japan's policy making including
an analysis of prospective alternatives to the strict main-
tenance of the U.S. - Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Chapter
IV is a study of Japan's emerging interest in her relations
with other Asian powers, specifically, the Soviet Union and
the People's Republic of China, Also included is the Commu-
nist powers ' relationships to the areas considered by Japan
to be security problems - Korea and Taiwan. The last chapter
explores the Japan of the 1980 's and the plausibility of
certain available policy alternatives. These are analyzed
within a general set of international/domestic circumstances




II. JAPAN INCORPORATED: POLITICAL
CONSTRAINTS ON ECONOMIC GROVJTH
For the building of a new Japan
Let's put our strength and mind together,
Doing our best to promote production
Sending our goods to the people of the world
Endlessly and continuously.
Like water gushing from a fountain
Grow industry, grow, grow, growl ...
Worker's Song
Matsushita Electric Co.
"Which of the four power blocs in the v;orld will Japan
end up joining?' asked the American oil tycoon of the
Japanese banker,
"'There will be four and a half blocs,' was the answer."
Perhaps this anecdote is indicative of Japan's percep-
tions about herself and her role — not quite a world power,
but solvent and secure in a position of economic superpower,
secure enough to think in terms of a "half bloc", an economic
bloc of which she would be the undisputed leader. Following
the end of World War II, both the Ikeda and Kishi adminis-
trations embarked on a serious effort to develop Japan's
economic potential. American military protection and new
foreign markets opened the door to a chain of events des-
tined to produce the most rapid economic growth ever wit-
nessed on the international scene. F'rom the post-war period
Gibney, Frank, Japan: The Fragile Superpower, p. 309,
W.W. Norton and Co., 1975.
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into the 1970 's, the Japanese have been working toward indus-
trial, economic and technological development under nearly
ideal conditions: industrious people, American aid and a
wealth of entrepreneurial talent. The "most crucial element
of this paradise has been the external situation: an under-
valued currency, exports growing 2.5 times as rapidly as
world trade, and technology and resource imports readily
available under favorable conditions." Another contributing
factor is the fact that Japan's minimal defense policies
required expenditures of less than one per cent of the GNP
.
"The rather negative security policies based on a minimum
defense, far from weakening Japan, may actually have streng-
thened it for^the new era in which economic power was to
3
count for much more than ever before." But time and the
vagaries of international politics have altered Japan's
economic paradise. The technology gap has been effectively
closed. Labor costs are steadily increasing with public
demands for higher wages and better living conditions. The
inflationary trend shows no immediate signs of letting up
and, perhaps most important, world opinion has changed.
Foreign countries are rapidly growing less and less amenable
2Clapp, Patricia and Ilalperin, Morton, United States -
Japanese Relations: the 1970 's
, p. 83, The Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1974.
3Langdon, F.C., Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 54, Univer-
sity of British Columbia Press, 1973.
12

to accepting and aiding Japan's hitherto unchecked economic
domination.
Follov/ing the end of World War II, Japan embarked on
her unparalleled economic progression by living by and with
the philosophy of "export or perish" . Her goal was to pro-
duce cheaply, rapidly and in quantity, taking her manufac-
tured products almost completely out of the traditionally
competitive system of world trade; for years, no other nation
could compete effectively. The words "made in Japan" appeared
on everything from electronic equipment to Christmas decora-
tions and "authentic" American Indian crafts. She developed
what is unflatteringly known as the "Japan Incorporated"
syndrome, a disease closely akin to that afflicting mono-
lithic corporations, egocentric and self-serving in all her
economic dealings with both Asia and the West. "Japan's
concept of foreign trade has been as of a process whereby
her industry has been fuelled and supplied, rather than one
which is intrinsically desirable for the international ex-
4
change of goods." Today, world interests are attempting
to fight back. Developing nations, seeking to advance their
own economies, are demanding that Japan open her doors to
more imports. The advanced nations of Europe and North
America have felt the pinch of Japan's hea\Y influx of
4Ellingworth, Richard, Adelphi Paper #90 , "Japanese
Economic Policies and Security," p. 11, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, October 1972.
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textiles and automobiles and are imposing newer, more vocal
restrictions. Perhaps this economic animosity will provide
the impetus for a change in Japan's "trade of die" role,
force her to become a responsible power at the expense of
a continued ten per cent per annum growth rate or face the
possibilities of being relegated to the position of "odd
man out" in the realm of international economic relations.
However, this change in world attitude is only a minute
part of Japan's economic dilemma. She is highly vulnerable
to world conflicts and changes in friend-enemy relationships
because of her near total reliance upon the import of raw
materials. In conjunction with her absolute need for all
forms of natural resources, is the necessity for maintaining
security of the sea lanes, straits and transit points through
which this lifeblood flows. In these days of prima donna
third world nations who enjoy capriciously exercising their
new-found powers, Japan's fears of having the sea lanes
severed are real ones.
The implications of Japan's economic dilemma have the
potential to be far reaching and serious and may prove to
be a catalyst in changing the overall pattern of Japanese
foreign policy; her relations with present allies and forirter
enemies. For thirty years Japan has worked hard and dili-
gently to produce the third greatest industrial economy in
the world. Today's economic problems may mark the success
or the failure of her continued prosperity.
14

A. THE ECONOMY AND NATIONAL SECURITY
In this era of power politics and detente, although
Japan appears to believe that she has no crucial military
worries, she admittedly has developed some severe economic
ones. The issues of economic security and national security
have become so closely intertwined, they are inseparable.
In the early years after World War II, any attempt by Japan
to conduct an independent foreign policy was stifled by Vjes-
tern (chiefly U.S.) domination and a world-wide fear of
recurring Japanese militarism. As a result, Japan's total
foreign policy effort became definitively economic oriented,
a policy based upon the need for survival through exports,
rapid industrial growth and a search for large, secure over-
seas markets as an outlet for her nev/ production capabilities
=
Imports were to be limited to those raw materials and pro-
ducts Japan did not as yet have the technological ability
to produce or the natural resources to exploit domestically.
Her economy grew at a staggering rate and, by 1960, Japan was
5
recording an annual growth rate in excess of ten per cent.
But American Japan-v.'atchers have predicted that Japan's days
of unbridled growth rates are over, that the oil crises,
the "Nixon shocks" and the trend toward greater market pro-
tection on the part of other countries, v/ill have an in-
creasingly debilitating effect upon Japan's continued economic
5 .Gibney, op. cit., p. 178
15

growth. Although Japanese economists appear to be more
optimistic, it does not seem feasible that Japan can any
longer reach the growth rate levels of the 1960 's. A
great deal of the blame lies with the world-wide recession
which hard hit the industrial nations and which may be the
cause of predicting that Japan's 17 per cent volume growth
7m exports will shrink significantly m 1975.
Japan's assurance about the stability of her role as an
economic power V7as probably initially and most severely
shaken by the 1971 so-called second Nixon shock. In August
of 19 71, President Nixon announced a sweeping new economic
policy promulgated as a cure for the American trade deficit.
Although superficially applicable to all U.S. trading part-
ners, there was no doubt in anyone's mind that the program
o
was aimed directly at Tokyo ' s giant trading companies. The
measures were sweeping and included a devaluation of the
dollar and quota restraints on imports to the United States.
The move not only took Japan by surprise, but under American
The Japan Economic Research Center estimates an average
rate of growth of 17.2% in the 1970-1980 time frame vice the
15.9% recorded in the period 1960-1970. This figure would
raise Japan's share of the world GNP from 6.4% to 12.5% and





. , p. 13.
o
Roskovsky, Henry, "Japan and the United States: Note
From the Devil's Advocate", United States — Japanese Rela-
tions, The 1970 's
, p. 79, edited by Patricia Clapp and
Morton Halperin, "Harvard University Press, 1974.
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pressure, led her into certain additional "voluntary"
moves. Under Prime Minister Sato's Eight Point Program,
Japan undertook moves of her own to ease the economic ten-
sion with the United States, including: a revaluation of
the yen (which had stood at 350 yen per dollar since 1949)
,
a progressive cut in the number of categories of imports
upon which the Japanese could impose quota restrictions, a
liberalization of the restraints imposed on American invest-
ors, the expansion of Japanese foreign aid programs to Asia,
cuts in import and commodity taxes placed on American autos
sold in Japan and "voluntary" restraints on exports.
Nixon Shock Tv/o was far more traumatic for Japan than
Nixon Shock One, the U.S. President's surprise visit to
Peking. Although the China shock was severe, it had "struck
at emotions" while the "Japanese would consider the 'economic
9
shock' as affecting very deeply their livelihood." Perhaps
more importantly, the shock confused her, shaking somewhat
her faith in her legendary American ally.
Japan reacted with dismay, v/onderment and
the inability to understand why she was being
punished for something that had always been
accepted in the past. The reaction of Japan to
her dam.aged pride and economic losses must
prompt the resolve to never again let herself
be placed in a position V7here another country
could unilaterally inflict similar chaos to
her economy. ^^
9Meyer, Armin, Assignment: Tokyo, An Ambassador's
Journal
, p. 171, Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1974.
Air University Report No. AU-1370-74
_
in Alliance and Allegiance , by C.F. Jewett, p. 7-8, 1974
, Japan — Her Dilcxpjaa
17

Even this wasn't the end of foreign reaction. The
friction with the United States over import quotas spilled
over into the European Economic Community which imposed its
own quotas in anticipation of an increase in Japanese
imports to Europe in an effort to offset the American loss.
South Korea and Taiwan, with their own rapidly growing
textile industries, slammed the door on further imports of
textiles from their Asian neighbors. More recently, with
American domestic auto sales at record lows, a potential
U.S. consideration to restrict auto imports could prove to
be a fatal blov\'' to the Japanese auto industry v/hich relies
upon the United States for the largest percentage of its
exports
.
All of this does not merely represent an inconvenience
for Japan, a temporary blow to her effcrts to improve her
people's standard of living, but a sharp and stinging blow
to her ecnomic viability — her very survival. It is not out
of the realm of possibility that her future foreign policies
may be forced upon Japan on the basis of protection of these
interests and against perceptible threats aimed at them.
Certainly it means an active endeavor to broaden her markets,
increase the number of her trading partners, and to embark
on quid pro quo programs with likely, but underdeveloped
prospects. Most of all, it could conceivably mean forced
neutrality, a gradual trend away from the Western camp to
broader, more viable alternatives.
18

B. THE ENERGY DILEMMA
Japan's biggest obstacle to continued growth is her near
total lack of natural resources and her rapidly increasing
usage of energy. By 1973 "oil was supplying more than
80 per cent of Japan's energy" and then Prime Minister
Tanaka warned that tlie country's consumption was scheduled
11to "triple in five or six years". Japan exists by energy
imports and "its industry and trade patterns are so finely
balanced that the slightest jar will cause shakings and
] 2tremors throughout the economy" . ' With that kind of heavy
reliance upon oil import, the recent Arab oil embargoes took
their toll. A continued shortage, can slow down industrial
production drastically, which will directly cause an increase
in inflation leading in turn to increased consumer demands.
High prices are already a fact of life in Japan. For
example, the cost of land has quadrupled in the past ten
years, food stuffs increase monthly and there has been a
significant depreciation in the value of private savings
over the past year. Overall consumer prices increased
134.5 per cent m 1972 compared with 15 per cent in 1973.





13 . . .
Yom.iuri Shimbun, April 1974.
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economic euphemism, but the fact remains that it is Japan's
critical need for energy resources that is the source of
the problem.
Natural gas used to be produced domestically. Today,
the demand for it is increasing far in excess of Japan's
ability for home production. Japan's indigenous coal
reserves are steadily declining and what is left is of poor
quality (that is, unsuitable for steel) . Her total coal
output has decreased from 55+ million tons in 19 61 to
40 million tons in 1967 to less than 20 million tons in
14 . t1972. Petroleum imports comprise 75 per cent of Japan s
total energy consumption vice 25 per cent less than ten
15years ago, with an import total m 1974 of 280 million
tons of crude oil and a projected need of 750 million tons
per year by 19 80.' If these figures sound nearly unreason-
able, the following chart emphasizes Japan's continuing
need for oil. Although the percentages are decreasing, the
chart still reflects an average growth of nearly ten per
cent per year.
14Nihon Keizai, "How to Reconstruct the Pillars of
Coal Policy", 21 March 1975.
15Osgood, Robert E., The VJeary and the V7ary
,
p. 29,
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972.
1 6Minix , Thomas , Japan; Alternatives for the Future ,




JAPAN'S PETROLEUM REQUIREMENTS (1960-1980)"'"'^
% of Growth in Oil % of Growth in Oil
Consumption Import;
1960 - 1965 22.4 22.4
1965 - 1970 17.5 17.5
1970 - 1980 9.4 9.4
In addition, by the early 1970 's Japan was relying upon
imports for 99 per cent of her iron ore, 50 per cent of her
18
wood, 80 per cent of her copper, 100 per cent of her bauxite
19
and 10 per cent of her aluminum, nickel and uranium.
Recent attempts to engage in ninety day stockpiling of energy
resources have only been partially successful in keeping ahead
of her needs. To compound her difficulties, traditional
"assured sources of supply" have been failing, chiefly due
to the supplier's own increasing domestic demands.





18Area Handbook for Japan
, p. 381, Department of the
Army , 1974.
] 9Miller, Michael, The United States and Japan: A Nev7
Geometry in Asia, p. 15*^ University of Washington, 1974.
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1) embark on increased efforts for alternative
energy sources (e.g. solar or nuclear energy),
2) expand and diversify energy suppliers to avoid
dependence upon a single source,
3) improve methods and means of transporting resources
to the homeland (i.e. the greatest quantities via the
shortest route)
.
Very little can be said about Japan's search for sub-
stitute energy sources. Solar energy is still in the dis-
tant future for Japan and, although "the Atomic Energy Insti-
tute estimated that sixty million kilov;att hours of nuclear
power would be available by 1985 . . . this would still leave
20Japan more than 70 per cent dependent on oil."
Therefore, Japan is expending most of her time and talent
searching for nev; and expanded energy supplies. Currently,
more than 85 per cent of Japan's oil comes from the Persian
Gulf countries with only small amounts from other nations
21(chiefly Indonesia) . It is obvious v;hy Japan should be
looking for new suppliers, uneasy as she is about relying
so much upon an area as politically volatile as the Middle
East.
Only Australia and Indonesia rank as substantial suppliers
in the Asian community. Australia provides more than 30 per
cent of Japan's iron ore, 50 per cent of her bauxite and 50
20Gibney, op. cit
.





22per cent of her lead and zinc needs. ' Indonesia supplies
a respectable proportion of Japan's oil and a sizeable percen-
tage of her own oil and oil product total exports (60 per
cent of Indonesia's crude oil and 80 per cent of her
23petroleum products)
.
However, Japan's nev;est trend and the move with poten-
tially the most important implications (both economically
and politically) is her new relations v/ith her Communist
neighbors, chiefly, the Soviet Union and the People's Repub-
lic of China. Although the Nixon shocks might have been the
catalyst in Japan's seeking new ties with Moscow and Peking,
it is more likely merely the critical need for additional
resource outlets.
Among the proposals and negotiations currently underway
with the Soviet Union are agreements for the exploitation
of oil, copper, coal, lumiber and natural gas in Western
Siberia and on Sakhalin Island.
The proposed Japan - USSR Tyumen oil development project
could conceivably net the Japanese 25-40 million tons of
24
crude oil per year via the second Trans-Siberian Railroad.
22Ellmgworth, op. cit .
, p. 14.
iDid .
24 . . . . . .The original proposal for a jointly funded pipeline
fell through in late 1973. Perhaps the Soviets recognized




Although currently only a proposal, sources indicate that
the Japanese may offer the Soviets a sizeable amount of money
for completion of the project, but both sides are still hesi-
tating at the proposition of hinging so much upon the "good
offices" of a traditional enemy. But the attempts at re-
source cooperation have not stopped with Tyumen. The table
below exhibits the extent of potential Japanese involvement
in Siberian development projects.
TABLE II






Yakutia Coal and Gas
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Required Total Investment







These efforts, none more than first overtures, have been
seen by some as an attempt to keep Japan dependent upon the
USSR rather than going elsewhere for new resources. In
25Research Analysis Corporation, Report # RAC~R-93,
Strategic Implications of Soviet-Japanese Trade , by Carl
Modig, p. 22, April 1970.
24

addition, solid economic relations with the Soviet Union
have the potential to seriously damage future rapprochement
with the People's Republic of China (especially if Japan
assisted in building a new railroad across Siberia to Soviet
naval ports, a distinct strategic advantage which could only
be viewed by the Chinese as a threat to their ov;n security) .
Thus, Japan has lost some interest in the Tyumen develop-
ment and has opened the doors to China's potential as a
supplier of crude oil.
Although Chinese developments in oil exploitation are
new, the country possesses vast potential, having increased
production from less than fifty million metric tons in 1973
to an estimated 100 million metric tons in 19 7 5 to a projec-
26tion of 400 million metric tons by 1980. A proposal has
been offered to the Japanese to assist in the development of
the Taiching oil field (the primary source of Chinese low
sulfur oil) and the building of a pipeline between Taiching
and Chu Huan Tau, in return for 10 per cent of China's total
output of crude. The offer is nebulous as is the future of
Chinese oil production. There is no doubt that China has
the oil reserves, but its technology is relatively primitive
and increased domestic consumption may reduce the amount of
oil and oil products available for export.
26Far Eastern Economic Review , "Peace: Japan's Achilles
Heel", 13 June 1975.
25

Although the attraction of Chinese and Soviet oil is
great, they are not Japan's only alternatives. As will be
seen in the next section, Japan is engaging in multi-lateral
aid programs in an effort to enhance the potential of lesser
developed nations (e.g. Indonesia and Thailand).
Equally as great a problem as where Japan will obtain
her energy resources is how she will transport them to the
homeland. As a maritime power, Japan relies heavily upon
continued freedom of the seas and open access to the inter-
national straits to get her goods and supplies to and from
market. For example, Japan currently receives more than
85 per cent of her oil supplies from the Persian Gulf coun-
tries and almost all oil from this area transits the Straits
27
of Malacca. ' The straits are congested, shallow and have
recently become a topic of serious concern at the Lav; of the
Sea Conference. If the decision of the Law of the Sea Con-
ference establishes an international twelve m.ile limit as
a rule of law, some 116 straits would fall within territor-
ial seas. This action could lead to the imiposition of tolls,
subjection of cargo to investigation and the restriction of
28passage of excessively large tankers as "non-innocent."




Far East Economic Review , "Congestion in the Straits",
17 January 1975. Also see the Far Eastern Economic Review




Japan maintains an impressive merchant fleet, possessing
some of the largest tankers in the world, many in excess of
200,000 tons each. This presents a physical problem in
transitting the relatively shallow Malacca Straits as the
safe draft is considered to be less than 200,000 tons fully
29laden. Anything in excess of this has only six feet of
clearance at some points. In addition, the recent million
gallon oil spill created by the Japanese tanker SHOWA MARU
in the Straits of Malacca has led to legitimate concern over
the dangers of collision and the pollution of valuable
fishing waters
.
Japan's alternative is utilization of the Lombok Straits
which cut between Indonesia, Singapore and Malaysia. These,
too have their drav7backs. The transit time and distance is
longer (1000 m.iles and three days longer) and therefore,
more expensive. They are even m.ore susceptible to congestion
problems because of their excessive narrowness (less than
five miles across) . The Lombok Straits are becoming a
political issue as well, generating demands by Indonesia
and Malaysia to declare them territorial waters. The nations'
obvious concern over pollution, damage to fishing and possi-
ble collisions, may ultimately lead to the same restriction
29Safe draught, fully laden is considered approximately
62 feet which is about that of a 200,000 ton tanker. Ships
between 300,000 and 500,000 dead weight tons are being built
and there are numerous 200,000-400,000 d.w.t. vessels already
in service. (Ellingworth, op. cit
. , p. 19 and p. 34-35.)
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considered for the Malacca Straits. In addition, v;ith the
fall of Vietnam and Cambodia to Communist governments, the
Japanese fear that further Comniunist control of Southeast
Asia might make future shipping through that region danger-
ous, even im^possible.
Serious thought is being given to the problem by Tokyo's
leaders, but the alternatives are few. Shipping around Aus-
tralia is so expensive as to be unfeasible, and consideration
for the development and building of a canal across Thailand's
Kra Peninsula is promising, but again, would put the Japanese
at the mercy of national whim. Therefore, obtaining, devel-
oping and maintaining diverse and productive sources of
energy is not enough; Japan must be assured the security of
her sea lanes as v;ell.
C. TRADE AND AID: SURVIVAL OF THE FITTEST
Japan's very existence still depends upon a foundation
of trade and open markets and, until recently, that trade
has been almost totally dependent upon the United States as
a continuing export base. Some Japanese have been "so much
aware of their economic dependence upon our market that they
liked to say that, when New York sneezed, Tokyo came down
30
with pneumonia," But in recent years, Japan has been hurt,
burned, prodded and jarred by American attempts to impose
30Downs, Ray F., and others, Japan: Yesterday and Today,
p. 201, The George School Readings on Developing Lands, 1970.
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restriction upon Japan's export policies and efforts to
increase American investment and to relieve the stringent
governmental controls imposed on U.S. businessmen. Perhaps
all of this has taught Japan a lesson which is leading her
into assuming more confidence in her ability to "make it on
her own." Although the United States is still Japan's
largest trading partner with an annual total volume of ex-
31ports in 1972 greater than $8 billion, ' Japan is broadening
her horizons and seeking new markets on which to reduce her
dependence upon American economic patronage.
Despite the oil crises, 1974 V7as a good trade year for
Japan. Exports continued to increase and imports to decrease
The recorded trade deficit was due largely to the exorbitant
increase in the price Japan had to pay for Middle Eastern
oil. The fact remains, however, that 1974 still marked a
year of domestic recession, and, to offset this at-home
crisis, Japan has stepped up her export drive. Disputes
with the United States and Europe over dollar-yen deficits,
textile imports and foreign investments, coupled with the
1971 Nixon shocks, gave Japan little hope that the West
would continue to provide a non-stop outlet for Japanese
exports. The result is a dramatic turn to Asia for new,
hitherto untapped markets. By 1974 statistics, Asia (in-





Japan's total trade. The amount of trade with the People's
Republic of China alone has increased from $1.1 billion in
1972 (the year in v/hich Japan opened diplomatic relations)
to 3.3 billion in 1974. Japanese exports to China in 1974
32
were ten times those of 1973. (See Tables III, IV and V).
Although the figures reflect only approximately one quarter
of the total trade with the United States, the significance
is great; Japan is actively seeking to reduce her dependency
upon the United States. China is concerned that imports to
Japan have, until now, consisted mainly of oil, timber and
foodstuffs (chiefly soybeans) , but Japan is embarking on
an active campaign to improve her position with all the
countries of Asia and this v;ill, of necessity, open the door
to greater im.ports from her Asia neighbors.
Hov.'ever, if Asia need no longer fear Japanese militarism,
she does still fear a Japanese invasion — an economic invasion
Saddled with the need to replenish foreign exchange reserves,
the nations of 7\sia are understandably wary of becoming too
dependent upon Japan. Japan, for her part, is attempting
to soothe these fears v/ith a new, vastly expanded program
of economic and technological aid completely apart from her
pro-Western foreign policy. "In the field of economic
cooperation with Asian nations, it is now necessary to make
a fundamental re-study of the way of our country's aid.
32Awanohara, Susumu, "Japan Prospers at Asia's Expense",
Far Eastern Econom.ic Review, 7 February 19 75.
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which had been completely incorporated into the Cold VJar
33
structure." The results have been impressive and have
included not only Asia, but Africa and the Middle East as
well. New economic interests in Southeast Asia have prompted
the spending of as much to that region in foreign aid as is
spent on the total national defense effort (i.e. one per
cent of the GNP)
.
Loans to Egypt have been made, totalling 38 billion yen,
for the expansion of the Suez Canal. Such a proposed expan-
sion would enable an increase in passable tonnage from 50,000
to 150,000 tons. Three hundred billion yen (approximately
one billion dollars) has been granted to Iraq for economic
project developm.ent, including a project for the separation
of crude oil from natural gas. In return, Iraq has agreed
to conclude several long-term contracts for the supply of
crude oil to Japan. In Iran another 300 billion yen was
provided in support of the Bandhar Shahpur petrochemical
plant, currently centered on developing facilities for the
production of 300,000 tons of ethylene per year. In Saudi
Arabia, Japanese financing is being obtained for the building
of oil refineries, petro-chemical plants and truck and auto
assembly factories. Indonesia, Japan's largest creditor
nation (and chief Asian oil supplier) is currently receiving
aid for the construction of a 400,000 kilowatt power plant
33Mainichi Times (Translation), 5 April 1975.
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on the Asahan River in North Sumatra and an aluminum refinery
with an estimated annual output of 225,000 tons. Even the
African states have been the recent recipients of Japanese
aid. Guinea requested financing for various domestic econ-
omic programs. Japan willingly provided the funds, and, in
return, will receive thirteen million tons of bauxite annually
with a future possibility of agreements for the receipt of
34
oil and iron ore.
Japan's motives are obvious, and although not purely
altruistic in nature, they have the potential of helping her
to solve her economic dilemma. Japan is playing Darwin's
game of "survival of the fittest" ~ surviving through an
uncanny capacity for adaptability. She has had her "coming
out" and is convinced that, despite a continuing need for
American cooperation and patronage, she can, with a little
ingenuity, make it on her own. The newest moves to expand
her markets and broaden her sources can only indicate Japan's
unwillingness to depend wholly upon any one nation or bloc
of nations for her economic security.
34 Dollar-yen figures and production estimates for all
aid programs v;ere obtained from a series of articles printed
in the Yomiuri Shimbun on Japanese aid and foreign investment
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III. THE POLITICS OF NON-POWER
A. THE THIRTY YEAR PEACE: 1945-1975
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace
based on justice and order, the Japanese people
forever renounce war as a sovereign right of
the nation and the threat or use of force as
a means for settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the pre-
ceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces,
as well as other war potential v/ill never be





The experience of World V7ar II was a shattering one for
the Japanese. The fact that they have been the only people
in history to have faced an actual nuclear attack has im-
pressed them deeply, and, in effect, has created a nation
38
of pacifists. To a certain extent Article IX was inserted
into the post-war Constitution at the direction of the Allies,
chiefly as a V7ritten assurance that the once awesome Imperial
Army would never have the opportunity for regeneration. (Post
38Many experts on Japan have written on and attempted
to understand the "new Pacificism". Discussion of the nuc-
lear allergy "phenomenon" and how it has affected the conduct
of Japanese foreign and defense policies can be found in:
Kahn, Herman, The Em.erging Japanese Superstate: Challenge
and Response , Prentice-Hall, 1970; Reischauer, Edwin, O.,
Japan: The Story of a Nation , Alfred A. Knopf, Revised 1974;




World War I Germany had seemingly taught the Allies a lesson
in fear and caution) . Today, Japan is an independent, self-
governing nation, no longer responsible to any occupation
force, but still deeply conscious of her primary role in
the awesome destruction of Asia thirty years ago. As a
result, Article IX stands, and, in 1975, Japan remains an
economic giant in the body of a military dwarf.
Despite the intent of Article IX, Japan was never fully
stripped of its defenses. An actual "armed force", hov/ever,
did not reappear until 1951 when, in response to open hos-
tilities in Korea, the American occupation forces instituted
a 75,000 man Police Reserve Force responsible for maintaining
Japan's internal security. Because of her weakened condition,
at the same time, in conjunction v/ith the San Francisco
Peace Conference, the United States concluded the Treaty of
Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States
of America and Japan. (/although revised in 19 6 and currently
operating on a year-to-year basis, the Mutual Security Treaty
remains in force essentially as it appeared under initial
ratification.) Some Japanese maintain that the initial
intent of both Article IX and the Security Treaty was to
ban all intrinsic military forces, even those devoted solely
39to self-defense. Americans maintain that the Security
39 The past and present debate over the legality of the
Self Defense Forces is testimony to this attitude mostly
expressed in the past by members and proponents of the
Japan Socialist and Japan ComiT\unist Parties.
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Treaty was instituted as "the only solution to Japan's
defense problems in a perilously unstable part of the
40
world..." Today, the need for the continued maintenance
of the Treaty is being questioned by both sides. Many
critics consider the arrangement "unequal" but no one can
. . 41
come to a decision as to unequal to whom. The Japanese
public considers the defense alliance to be "more a favor
unwisely granted to the United States than an arrangement
42
of benefit to Japan". Americans, on the other hand, assert
that the Treaty has provided the Japanese with a "free ride"
on American coattails for nearly thirty years. Japan's
gross defense expenditures comprise less than one per cent
per annum of her total Gross National Product. Self Defense
Force (SDF) manning levels have increased from 206,000 in
431960 to a mere 232,000 by 1972. Her per capita expendi-
tures are less than one-tenth those of the United States and
40Reischauer, Edwin O., Japan: The Story of a Nation,
p. 241, Alfred A. Knopf, Revised 1974.
41There are many references throughout the literature to
the Mutual Security Treaty as an "unequal treaty". For
further discussion on the reasons for these attitudes see:
Reischauer, Edwin, Japan: The Story of a Nation , Knopf, 19 74;
and his Introduction to Clapp and ifalperin's book United
States-Japanese Relations , Harvard University Press, 1974. In




University of British Columbia Press, 1972.









4 4less than one-sixth those of West Germany. (See Tables VI
and VII) . Despite the fact that a build-up in Japan's
defenses would lead to greater autonomy, little effort seems
to be brought to bear in that direction. Why? There appear
to be several factors working against any substantial
proposed build-up plan.
1) Since the 19 50 's, the Japanese have tended to view
their national, regional and international power as purely
economic in nature; military pov;er has been relegated to
the status of being counter-productive. 2) The Japanese
express an almost irritating complacency regarding any
threat to their physical security. "Japanese apprehensions
focus almost totally on what they regard as their acute and
4 5
extraordinary economic vulnerabilities." 3) The consensus
in recent years among the voting public has been that the
problems of standard of living, education, inflation and
pollution are Japan's current critical needs requiring the
immediate attention of the government, not an expanded
military. 4) Big business interests appear to be staunchly
anti-rearmament because of possible damage to overseas
markets and sources of raw materials due to adverse foreign
^ The Military Balance, 1975-1976
,
p. 76-77, International
Institute of Strategic Studies, London, 1975.
45Colbert, Evelyn, "National Security Perspectives: Japan
and Asia", The Modern Japanese Military System, p. 201,




COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE EXPENDITURES
Country
Expend/Budget









United States 92,800 430 6.0
USSR^ 103,800 409 10.6
W. Germany 16,260 260 3.6
Great Britain 10,380 184 5.2
France 12,250 233 3.4
JAPAN 4,484 41 0.9
Israel 3,503 1-,043 32.0
Italy 4,220 76 2.8
Iran 10,405 314 9.0
Egypt 6,103 163 22.8
Percentages calculated in local currency. VJhere official
GNP figures are not available, estimates have been made.
Estimating Soviet expenditures are difficult and the
figures shown should be used with caution. For rationale
and methods of estimation used, consult the source, p. 10.
If financial assistance to VJ. Germany had been included,
the entry v/ould read: 10,812 314 4.3
46SOURCE: The Military Ba lance, 1975-1976
,
p. 76-77,
























































47SOURCE: Figures from 1965-1974 are from Nihon no Anzen
Hosho (Japan's National Security), a semi-official annual
publication . Other figures are from various sources as





opinion. Surveys conducted over the years have generally
netted the follovv'ing results:
TABLE VII I
SUPPORT FOR EXPANSION OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES (%) ^
1960 1962 1970 1972 1973 1974
STRENGTHEN SDF 19 16 16 10 9 11
KEEP IT SAME 49 54 53 42 62 42
WEAKEN SDF 15 14 12 23 5 31
OTHER; DON'T KNOW 17 16 19 25 24 6
100 100 100 100 100 100
The potential revival of militarism is anathema to the people;
the Japanese have become a nation of conscientious objectors.
In addition, the modern Japanese is intimately concerned with
his image abroad, an image which, in many Asian countries,
still bears the stigma of the Japanese conqueror. TVny build-
up, it is feared, might be construed as a rejuvenation of the
militarism exhibited in the 1930 's.
The existing constitutional ban against possession of
offensive forces is probably the most insurmountable obstacle.
48Source for Survey: 1960, 1962 and 1972 conducted by
the Prime Minister's Office, Public Information Division:
19 70 study conducted by Dr. Douglas H. Mendel Jr. as private




The very legitimacy of even a self-defense force is being
questioned in the courts. In 1959, a judge further inter-
preted Article IX to include foreign as well as domestic
military presence. A subsequent Supreme Court hearing
ruled that Article IX did not include provisions for the
prohibition of self-defense (of which the U.S. Forces Japan
are a part) but hedged at ruling on the consitutionality of
4 9the SDF Itself, nov;ever, m September 19 73, considering
a case involving a public forest preserve slated to be turned
over to the S.DF, a Japanese court declared the SDF unconsti-
tuional citing Article IX of the 19 4 6 Constitution. The
judge's ruling, in part, read:
Article IX of the Consitution bans all arma-
ment, including even defensive weapons; it
abolishes arms, and denies even the right of
belligerency. In viev7 of their scale, equip-
ment and capability, the Ground, Maritime and
Air Self Defense Forces are land, sea and air
forces as specified in Article IX, paragraph 2
and are unconstitutional. The claim that they
are necessary for the defense of the country
cannot be a basis for denying that they are
not military units or v;ar potential.^
The Government of Japan (GOJ) argues that the SDF is not
in violation because it does not represent the kind of "war
potential", in modern terms, prohibited by Article IX. The
SDF is organized strictly as a means of military preparedness
49McNelly, Theodore, "The Constitutionality of Japan's
Defense Establishment", in the Modern Japanese Military System,
p. 103-105, edited by James H. Buck, Sage Publications, 1975.
50Translated ruling of Judge Shigeo Fukushima, Sapporo
District Court, 7 September 1973.
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for the defense of the home islands and is prohibited from
any dispatch overseas including participation in United
Nations missions, peace-keeping forces or police actions.
Many GOJ officials have even gone so far as to deny the very
existence of a Navy, per se.
Needless to say, the Japanese government gets unnerved
at the prospect of SDF law suits and tries to keep such
issues out of the courts. However, the 1973 Sapporo
decision is still pending in the Supreme Court, whose
judges are notoriously conservative. The result will m.ost
likely be no decision at all, under the guise that the issue
is a political one, or a reversal of the Sapporo ruling.
Despite the fact that challenging the existence of a
military force seems unrealistic, the constitutional ban is
taken seriously by the Japanese and is currently the
greatest obstacle to force build-up. Passage of a constitu-
tional amendment would require a Liberal Democratic Party
majority and massive public support, neither of which the
current government can claim.
In spite of her pacifist nature, Japan has been making
some small attempt at build-up and modernization, mostly
at the urging of the United States. As an integral part of
former President Nixon's "burden sharing" program, the U.S.
has sought to achieve a substantial improvement in Japan's
ability for both air and sea defense. The American concept
of Japan's responsibility for her own defense includes:
44

1) close in air defense, including reconnaissance,
surveillance and AEW mission,
2) convoy and escort responsibility,
51
3) ASW and harbor protection.
Formal programmed defense plans were not new to the Japanese.
As early as 1956, plans were made for a series of four five-
year defense build-up programs. The first two (19 58-1962 and
1962-1966) were basically quantitative in nature and relied
heavily upon U.S. assistance and aid. The Third Defense Plan
(1966-1971) began to concentrate more heavily on assuming the
harbor protection role including the acquisition of new
ships (one equipped with surface-to-air missiles, 14 escorts
and two helicopter carriers) , five submarines and ASW aircraft.
The Ground Self Defense Force acquired 160 new armored
vehicles, ten transport aircraft and the replacement of 2800
tanks. The Fourth Defense Plan was the direct result of the
Japan Defense White Paper issued in 1970 which stated that
Japan would provide for an "independent" or "autonomous"
defense with the U.S. Security Treaty acting in a "supple-
mentary relationship"
.
51Fraser, Angus M., Possibilities of Defense
Complementarities Between the U.S. and Japan
, p. 1, Depart-
ment of State, 19 July 1974.
52Iwashima, Hisao, "Japan's Defense Policy", Strategic
Review, Volume III, No. 2, p. 19, Spring, 1975.
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The goals of the Fourth Defense Plan included:
1) GSDF - acquisition of:
280 tanks, 170 armored vehicles, 9 automatic
mobile cannon, 90 self-propelled artillery,
159 tactical aircraft and three additional
HAV?K surface-to-air missile units
2) ASDF - acquisition of:
three more NIKE-J missile sites, 46 F4E-J
fighter aircraft, 14 RF4E reconnaissance
aircraft, 59 T-2 trainers, 68 FST2 support
aircraft and 24 C-1 transports
3) MSDF - acquisition of:
13 escort vessels (including tvzo equipped
with helos and one with surface-to-surface
missiles), 5 submarines, one supply ship,
92 aircraft (including 87 designated for
ASW) .53
The Fourth plan's goals were to decrease the overall quantity
in all services but to effect substantial qualitative
improvements. Unfortunately, the plan has since been
abandoned. The oil crises of 1973 and 1974, inflation,
soaring production costs and procurement expenses, have
effectively cancelled or delayed the majority of programs
delineated by the Fourth Plan.
SDF problems extend even further than econom.ics. The
prestige of the military in modern Japan is low as is the
pay scale. Young Japanese, educated in the anti-militarist
doctrine and in the new economic prosperity, see no future
in the military. The result is difficulties in recruiting





and there is little money available for or interest in,
research and development. Therefore, the Japanese,
historically, have had to depend upon foreign, often outdated
technology. "Lack of public interest in defense matters,
difficulty in finding a threat and fears of foreign reaction,
continue to hamper definition of the problem, much less aid
54m developing solutions."" This popular trend of preference
for a m.inimum self-defense has generated a military seemingly
capable of very little. Says Osamu Kaihara, the former
Secretary of the National Defense Council, regarding any
potential conflict between Japan and the Soviet Union: "The
Ground SDF could fight as an Army for only three or four
days; the Air SDF would be destroyed in ten minutes and the
MSDF might as well consider the Sea of Japan the Sea of
Russia.
It seems that the thirty year "peace" has been a forced
one, a product of majority opinion, constitutional law, and
the perils of economic superpower status. Nevertheless,
Japan does have subtle security worries, and chief among them
are the recognition of the possibility of limited wars in
Asia and the increase of Sino-Soviet influence in the Far
East. Although the present Miki government (as well as those
of Tanaka and Sato) have determined to rely upon the United
54Auer , James E
.
, The Postwar Rearmament or Japanese
Maritime Forces , 1945-1971, p. 2'56, 1973.'
55Buck, James H., op. cit
.
, p. 22 0.
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states as the "deterrent against the threat of wars using
nuclear weapons, large scale armed disputes and strategic
56
attacks" and although they recognize that the probability
of an overt attack by either the Soviet Union or the People's
Republic of China is small, Japan does realize that she must
be a partner in deterrence because of her great physical
vulnerability. Japan generally perceives that any substan-
tial threats to her national security must be on the
following order:
1) threats to major Japanese shipping lanes caused
by potential Communist control of the straits and/or
substantially increased Soviet naval activity,
2) open hostilities in the Republic of Korea,
3) substantial interference with Japanese trade
and investments,
4) the breakdown of the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security
Treaty and/or loss of faith in the validity of U.S. commit-
ments in Asia.
With tliis in mind, what then are Japan's defense options?
The next two sections will explore these — first the nuclear




appeared as a translation of the
Defense White Paper issued by the JDA, October 1970.
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B. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE
Much note has been given in recent years to the possi-
bility of Japanese membership in the nuclear elite. No one
can dispute the fact that Japan has the technological
capability. Some observers have assum.ed that Japan could
detonate a nuclear device, under a crash program, in as
little as six months. The problem is ~ does the government
and, more precisely, do the people, have the will to embark
on an active nuclear program? The decision appears to be all
the more difficult because it must be a purely political
rather than a military one. Since the establishment of the
1946 Constituion, Japan has lived tenaciously by its three
point non-nuclear policy (reaffirmed by the 1970 Defense
White Paper), that is, "not to manufacture, not to possess
57
and not to bring in such devices." Despite these strong
non-nuclear feelings, the controversy still rages within the
Diet whether or not to com.plete final ratification of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treat (NPT) . If ratified and
accepted, the NPT will enforce non-production and non-
possession of nuclear weapons by the Japanese for a period
of twenty years, "The essence of the NPT is that nuclear
states undertake not to provide non-nuclear powers . . .with







in their acquisition and that non-nuclear states undertake
not to receive nuclear explosive devices or help in their
5 8
acquisition from any source whatsoever."
Protestations to the ratification of the Treaty (Japan
is already a signatory) seem to fall into four main categories
First, the Treaty is deemed politically inequitable (that is,
between nuclear and non-nuclear states) by imposing a system
of inspections upon non-nuclear, but not upon nuclear m.embers
.
Secondly, the Treaty reserves to the nuclear powers the right
to engage in peaceful nuclear explosions. Third, the obliga-
tion of nuclear pov;ers to actively work towards arms control
are insufficient. (They have since taken SALT I and SALT II
into consideration.) Lastly, fear that committment to the
non-possession of nuclear weapons will seriously affect a
nation's physical security and a desire to keep the future
option open (especially since the PRC is a non-signatory and
59
since the detonation of a nuclear device by India) . It
appears that simple concern for the complete protection of
the home islands is creating some hesitancy in making such
a long-term commitment. The Liberal Democratic Party
publicly wants the NPT ratified providing the following three
conditions are met:
58Maddox, John, Adelphi Paper # 113 , "Prospects for
Nuclear Proliferation", international Institute for Strategic






1) strict maintenance of the U.S. -Japan Security
Agreement and a formal re-affirmation of the U.S.
commitment to Japan (technically accomplished with the
announcement of Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine").
2) establishment of an effective system of national
defense
.
3) an increase in budget allocations to be used in
the peaceful applications of nuclear energy in Japan.
In addition, Fojreign Minister Miyazawa has added the
proviso that emergency cases may be acceptable for nuclear
introduction by the United States if based upon the Security
Treaty and with prior consultation viith and the approval of
the Japanese government (a technical violation of both the
NPT and of Article IX of the 194 6 Consitution)
.
The split in both public and governmental opinion
regarding ratification is significant in the mere existence
of debate. In 19 70, the Japan Defense White Paper re-affirmed
the non-nuclear policy but also warned against "becoming too
dependent upon other nations for defense" . Herman Kahn
believes tliat modern technology has caused the Japanese
"nuclear allergy" to fade somewhat and describes what he
^^The Asahi Shimbun , 11 April 1975.
Bullard, Monte R. , "Japan's Nuclear Choice," Asian
Survey
, p. 8 50, Volume XV, No. 4.
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calls the "Third Generation Effect". This, claims Kahn,
is the result of a new generation which does not remember
Hiroshima and Nagasaki and v/hich has been raised in a culture
now dominated by Western influence. Their understandable
desire to return to the old culture and traditional values
may also lead to increased patriotism and nationalism
ft "^
expressed as the inevitability of Japanese power. Still
other "Japan watchers" believe that it is no longer feasible
for the country to maintain its status as a great economic
64power without concomitant military power. Under the
assumption that these opinions are valid, what would it take
for Japan to develop a nuclear force and what type of force
V70uld it require?
First of all, the goals established for the Fourth Defense
Plan have been abandoned with little hope for budget increases
in the Fifth Plan, However, a second-strike capcibility force
is still feasible without drastically increasing expenditures.
A force of twenty SSBNs and 100 strike aircraft would cost an
estimated $20 billion over a period of ten years which would
be approximately .7 per cent of the GNP for 1972. Such a sum
r 9
Kahn, Herman, op. cit
.
,
p. 6 and p. 9.
Kahn, Herman, op. cit
,
p. 9 and p. 14,
Sorenson, Jay B., "Japanese Policy and Nuclear Arms,"
p. 11-13, National Strategy Information Center, October 1975
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could be relatively painlessly absorbed "without upsetting
national priorities."
Secondly, since the United States has ratified the NPT
and since it believes that nuclear proliferation contributes
significantly to international tensions and instabilities,
Japan could not, at least for the near future, expect assis-
tance from the United States (nor from the Soviet Union,
given that country's previous experience v/ith China) in the
development of such a program. Nevertheless, Japan's tech-
nical prov/ess is wholly capable of developing such a force
on its ov/n. Despite Japan's virtually complete dependence
upon other nations for uranium, they already possess the
capability of refining weapons-grade plutonium.
The most insurmountable obstacle remains the Article IX
prohibition. Assum.ing an amendment to the Constitution can
be obtained, what then, if any, are the advantages of a
nuclear capability for Japan?
As far as Japan's territorial security is concerned, she
is highly vulnerable. Her population and industrial centers
are concentrated in a few major urban areas on the main island
of Honshu. "Aircraft, now in service, flying from bases in
the PRC or Soviet Asia, can strike any significant target in
65Muraoka, Kunio, Adelphi Paper #9 5, "Japanese Security
and the United States," p. 26, International Institute of
Strategic Studies, February 1973.
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the home islands. Any such attack on the six major target
areas: Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kyoto and Kobe, would
destroy approximately 60 per cent of Japan's industrial capa-
f> 7
city and a large segment of the population. Despite the
seeming conclusion that a first strike against Japan would
virtually destroy her will and/or her capacity to retaliate,
one cannot stipulate an "unacceptable level of damage."
Instead of basing one's judgment "on difficult premises about
tolerance for punishment and a nation's v/ill to strive for
its goals," one must appreciate "the cardinal premise of
deterrence, v;hich is to hold an adversary's population hostage
6 8in order to dissuade it from initiating a major attack."
From this viev.'point, a second-strike deterrent force employed
on countervalue targets could be of utility, if it meets the
following requirements of 1) an effective retaliatory system,
2) a perceptibly capable delivery system and 3) a damage-
limiting system to protect Japan's own economic and indus-
trial centers. Such a deterrent might be tactical, strategic
or a combination. "The most credible form of deterrent for
Japan would be built on a second-strike capability v;ith a
69
















SLBM fleet and possibly a defensive ABM system. The most
cost-effective system v/ould consist primarily of low-yield
Plutonium bombs delivered by long-range fighter bombers
.
Either of the above systems could conceivably provide an
adequate deterrent capable of striking Siberian targets and
many of the industrial centers of mainland China (although
China is slightly less vulnerable because of her widely
dispersed population)
.
The arguments for and against a nuclear capability lean
farther tov/ard the feeling that, at least for the present,
nuclear weapons would add little to the nation's security
while providing fuel for a destructively divisive debate
among the populace. A population facing the problems of low
wages, inadequate housing and pollution will not easily
accept a defense oriented economy, seemingly the end result
of a decision to go nuclear. However, there are potential
threats and circujnstances which could conceivably m.ake that
decision an inevitable one.
Japan is highly vulnerable, as much to economic strangu-
lation as to nuclear attack. Ker "trade or die" attitude
towards policy makes Japan far more dependent upon the vagar-
ies of international cooperation than any other nation. The
possibility of seeing her markets threatened, her vital sea
lanes denied or her critical resources cut off, could lead





Loss of faith in the American committment would be
another rationale for asserting a nuclear capability. Many
Japanese do not feel that the United States would risk a
nuclear war in Japan's defense. The experience of Southeast
Asia and the Nixon shocks have only been partially compen-
sated for by President Ford's "New Pacific Doctrine." A
future American "failure" in Korea or an overt withdrawal
of the committment to Japan could very well force the Japanese
into ensuring their security via their own resources, as a
military power^ surely, as a nuclear power, probably. For
the time being, one m.ust assume that the Japanese regard a
nuclear capability as irrational, a costly move which would
guarantee them nothing and net them little but international
suspicion. Hov/ever, one must be cognizant of the limitations
of detente and of the potential for sudden changes in a less
than stable international system.
"If the Japanese are able to solve the
dilemmas of national security and status
without producing nuclear weapons them-
selves, they may decide permanently to
abstain from doing so. If not, and if
the alliance with the United States is ^^
terminated, Japan could easily go nuclear."
C. JAPAN'S SECURITY OPTIONS
Japan is not facing a future as promising as her past
twenty years have been. The exigencies of time and a changing
international scene m.ay very well force her to fully accept






the responsibilities of her status as an economic superpower.
If Japan is to maintain that position, some change in her
concept of national (and regional) security must be forth-
coming. VThat then are Japan's defense alternatives in addi-
tion to the option of nuclear weapons already discussed?
They include:
1) continued reliance upon the United States - Japan
Mutual Security Treaty,
2) a gradual, but substantive, build-up in domestic
self-defense forces (both quantitatively and qualitatively)
,
3) a return to neutralism.
A continued reliance upon the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty
is considered both beneficial and decirable by the present
Japanese government. In addition to the obvious economic
benefits, the formal committment tends to ensure that Japan
will not be relegated to the status of a political pawn in
East Asia. However, critics of the Treaty abound. A survey
conducted by Dr. Douglas H. Mendel in 19 70, revealed a sur-
prising antipathy to U.S. military presence. Thirty-one
per cent of those surveyed were opposed to U.S. presence
because of the fear that such an overt presence had the
potential of involving Japan in an unwanted Asian war. Thirty
per cent considered the bases a public nuisance citing noise,
prostitution and G.I. crime and misconduct as rationale. An
additional 23 per cent felt that there was no threat to
Japan severe enough to warrant the presence of a foreign




"Other" or "Don't Know" answers. As a matter of fact, most
Japanese consider defense a matter of domestic rather than
foreign policy. Despite all of this, the Japanese seem to
be convinced that, although tliere is a danger in close
association with the United States, there is a bigger danger
72m the lack of such an alliance.
Secondly, there is a m.ove among the meirtbers of the U.S.
Congress to reduce the expense of maintaining overseas troops
and bases. This has resulted in severe military cutbacks in
both personnel and support facilities, almost exclusively in
the Pacific Region. The question remains whether or not the
treaty can remain a viable document solely on the basis of
a verbal, rather than a troop committment. However, in a
practical sense, since an actual invasion of the home islands
is highly improbable, land based U.S. forces are not an abso-
73lute necessity. "They (Japan) find it difficult to imagine
any adversary finding the occupation of Japan worth the
74
costs."' The force of the Seventh Fleet, utilizing Japanese
71Mendel, Douglas H. Jr., "Public Views of the Japanese
Defense System," The Modern Japanese Military System , p. 174,
edited by James H. Buck, Sage Publications, 19 75.
72 Reischauer, Edwin O., personal interviev; with the
author, 15 September 1975.
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In actuality, there are virtually no operational units







owned and maintained bases and support facilities, appears
to be a viable alternative to land based troops. The com-
plete withdrawal of the U.S. physically from Japanese soil
need not necessarily damage the alliance providing the
"umbrella" remains intact.
Lastly, continuing to rely upon the United States for its
national security is feasible provided the Japanese maintain
faith in "the conunittment. " Although few Japanese have the
tendency to equate confidence in the American committment
with a need for a stronger domestic defense, tPie fact remains
that the experience of Vietnam and Cambodia has been a some-
what unsettling one. A complete loss of faith v/ould inevi-
tably terminate any effectiveness the Treaty might have as
a security measure.
Japan's second option is to embark upon a serious program
of gradual, but substantive build-ups in the defense forces.
The reasons against such a move have already been discussed.
The events which m.ight make such a policy inevitable include:
1) a complete lack of faith in the United States
'
will or in its capability to come to Japan's aid in accor-
dance with the provisions of the Security Treaty,
2) the collapse of the Korean Peninsula,
3) an appreciable and/or significant reconciliation
in the Sino-Soviet dispute,
4) a severe threat, from an external source, to the
economic, and therefore to the internal, stability of Japan.
This second option, coupled with a loss of faith in the
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American security "umbrella" might also conceivably lead to
the establishment of a regional security agreement V7ith the
other friendly nations of Asia.
The ttiird alternative is to return to a policy of neu-
tralism, a move considered almost impossible given Japan's
present status as an economic superpov;er. However, the
prospect of a neutral, unaligned Japan is not totally
unfeasible.
These options are not all inclusive. They must be viewed
v/ith caution and not taken as a panacea for Japan's future
problems. Their probabilities are uncertain and their
potential utility is questionable. The Japanese are a
highly rational people who can never be expected to do the
"right" thing in international eyes, but only that which
provides Japan with the widest range of alternatives deeraed
to be in the best interest of the government and the people.




IV. THE NEW ASIAN ENVIRONxMENT
He Who throws a pebble can change the center
of gravity of the earth. All nations ... can
affect the course of history. The gravita-
tional attraction between any two bodies . .
.
is directly proportional to their mass ....
Defining mass for political entities is, of
course, not easy. It must, be a composite
of economic, military, political, demographic,
moral and other forces. It would also include
the capability of exercising creative respon-
sibility in the quest for international
equilibrium which is necessary if collisions




Japan's gravitational attraction to Asian nations of
primary security interest is becoming a relatively new ele-
ment of Japanese foreign policy. For twenty years, Japan has
had to face the dilemma of being an economic power that is
militarily weak. Such an unstable condition makes assertion
of Japan's political "power" difficult, forcing her to seek
influence and status by means other than military. However,
even this is proving difficult, attempting to further Japan-
ese political and security interests in Asia, while still
being considered, in most circles, a pawn of the Americans.
As a result, Japan is m.oving more and more towards developing
autonomous policies better in keeping v/ith the advancement
of her own independent interests. Her weakness in arm^s is
partially being compensated for with trade, aid and invest-
ments, perhaps in an effort to avail herself of a status
and a power hitherto only achieved by military force.
61

A. THE SECURITY GAP: KOREA AND TAIWAN
A study conducted in 1971 by the Stanford Research Insti-
tute arrived at the conclusion that the nations of Asia of
primary interest to the political and security aspects of
Japan's foreign policy included: the U.S.S.R., the People's
Republic of China, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia. Of
only slightly lesser importance v;as the Republic of China
75(Taiwan) . Relations with Indonesia are relatively good
with Japan's chief concern being that country's dominance
of the Straits of Malacca, the vital sea lane through which
passes the majority of Japanese crude oil from the Middle
East. The cases of the U.S.S.R. and the PRC v/ill be considered
separately.
Relations with Korea and Taiwan are slightly different,
considering the physical security aspects inherent in the
continued stability of these areas. The Nixon-Sato Joint
Communique of 1969 stated most concisely that "the security
of South Korea is 'essential' and the security of Taiv;an is
7 f,
'important'" to the security of Japan. Still another study
referred to "a first priority national interest circle whose
77perimeter includes Korea and Taiwan."
75Stanford Research Institute, Japanese Security Posture
and Policy, 1970-1980




77Gordon, B.K. and Kim, Y.C., Asi a Defense Postures, Vol
I_, Research Analysis Corporation, Report itRAC-R-132-VOL I,
p. 5, September 1971.
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Historically, Korea was the key to the conquest of Japan.
From China, from Russia, from Mongolia, troops crossed the
mountainous terrain with its treacherous winters in the hope
of defeating Nippon. The historical analogy of com.paring
Korea to "the dagger pointed at the heart of Japan" is no
longer a completely valid one in this modern age of warfare
technology when conventional routes of invasion have lost
som^e of their irieaning. However, since the Korean War, Japan
views all events on that Peninsula as significant and mean-
ingful. Conversely, "Japan has becom.e a major, even indis-
7 8pensable, factor in South Korea's well being."
Politically, even in recent years, Japan and Korea have
79
never been amicable neighbors. Residual hostility on both
sides, persists. Koreans vividly remember the brutal and
repressive occupation by Japan. For their part, the Japanese
have traditionally viewed the Koreans as an inferior people.
Minor disputes continue today over debated fishing rights,
control of the Takashima Islands and the status of Korean
nationals residing in Japan. But the disagreements are
7 8Abramowitz, Morton, "Moving the Glacier: The Two
Koreas and the Powers," Adelphi Paper #80, p. 5, Interna-
tional Institute of Strategic Studies, August 1971.
79Korea, here, refers solely to South Korea, although
N. Korea is of primary concern to Japan especially in its
relations with the South. Japan currently has voiced no
open support for re-unification or for full diplomatic ties




relatively minor and the security benefits, to both sides,
are great.
Although South Korea is rapidly becoming an important
area of Japanese trade and investments, militarily, the ROK
continues to rely solely upon the protection of the United
States. Many feel today that the U.S. intervention in Korea
in 19 50 was a move directly meant to protect Japan rather
80than to secure the Korean Peninsula itself. The move was
a stop-gap measure designed to prevent a v/eak Japan from
falling into hostile control. Therefore, the critics ask,
does the United States need to continue playing the protector
role in Korea or should the burden now fall upon Japan?
The United States went to war in Korea
largely because of Japan-s potential value
in the Cold War. ... The United States has
been on the brink of war elsewhere in Asia
because of Japan's strategic value as an
ally. ... However, while the United States
was prepared to fight for Japan . . . American
leaders also recognized that eventually
Japan would have to and ought to reclaim
its autonomous position of leadership in
East Asia.^1
Recent U.S. troop withdrawals from Korea have led a
few observers to believe that Japan should fill the gap, in
her own interest as v/ell as in the interest of South Korea.
"The U.S. ... miight find it a more comfortable arrangem.ent if
80Peterson, D.H., Korea: Changing Sphere of Influence
,
p. 20, Air War College, April 1974.
O 1
Olsen, Edward A. , "The Nixon Doctrine in East Asian




she were not so totally committed (to Korea) and if Japan
could be brought into some sort of dual superpov/er agree-
on
ment to protect the sovereignty of the ROK." But there
are obstacles, not the least of which is the constitutional
ban and current Japanese defense policy. However, the out-
break of any hostilities on the Peninsula could "greatly
influence Japan's sense of well-being and security and
thus, inevitably, Japanese defense policy." Another obsta-
cle is the indisputable fact that Korea and Japan dislike and
distrust each other. Given the option, Korea v/ould almost
certainly attempt to "go it alone" rather than sanction the
landing or basing of Japanese troops on Korean soil. Never-
theless, diplomacy and economics often do much to assuage
subliminal hostilities. Continued open attemps at honest
and friendly relations may alter these feelings. This, plus
decreasing U.S. involvement, resulting in a concern for
"remote deterrence", and the increasing military capability
of the North, could conceivably push South Korea into a
84
more substantial dependence upon Japan. Although barely
plausible today, the alternative is there; changes in Korea's
status and further U.S. pullouts miay hallmark a concomitant





8 3Abramowitz, op. cit.
, p. 5.
8 ^
^Abramowitz, op. cit., p. 12-13
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efforts to improve relations, although of great concern to
the government of Japan, are subtle and totally economic
oriented.
The U.S. military presence in the South remains highly
visible and "the committment remains strong, but popular
o c
support, its flesh and blood, is attenuating ..." of great-.
est concern to Japanese security would be the eventuality of
the entire Korean Peninsula falling under hostile (i.e. PRC
or Soviet) control.
The People's Republic of China has devoted a great deal
of time, financing and miilitary support to the North (the
DPRK) beginning with its participation in the Korean Conflict
and culminating in the signing of a mutual defense agreement
with the DPI\K in 19 61. There appears to be almost an emo-
tional bond between the Chinese and the Koreans which does
not exist with the Soviets. Their relationship goes back,
many centuries and, historically, the "strategic use made of
the peninsula by Japan in its continental expansion . . . served
only to strengthen the Chinese conviction of Korea's import-
ance to them ..." China continues to provide extensive
economic aid to the North and by the defense agreement of






, Japan and Korea: America's Allies
in the Pacific, p. 55, Walker and Co., 1965.
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Soviet interests in the Korean Peninsula are not quite
as specific and not of such a long-standing nature. How-
ever, given the Sino-Soviet rift, the fear of Chinese
encirclement has kept Soviet interest alive, if not intense.
They also maintain a mutual defense agreement with the DPRK,
but the degree of support, arms and aid to the peninsula
probably relates more to the Sino-Soviet dispute than to
any real concern for Korean security. "Soviet and DPRK
policies generally collide. Korean unification is definitely
marginal to Soviet interests. ... Lip service to unification
is required, as is material support, but the Soviets are
p n
not willing to risk much ..."
Taiwan's position relative to Japiin is perceived as some-
what less of a problem. However, given certain circumstances,
Taiwan could be no less formidable a threat. One observer
compared the island of Formosa, in hostile hands, to a "giant
aircraft carrier" capable of extending its airpower to the
South as far as the Philippine Sea and to the Nortii as far
8 8
as the Southern Ryukyus . Taiwan could prove to be a point
of leverage, a means of economically s tangling Japan if
used by a hostile power to achieve hegem.ony in Asia. A
Communist power could make effective use of Taiwan's manu-
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Japan out of the Asian economic market. "Japan's economic
ties with the Philippine Islands, Singapore, Malaysia, In-
89donesia, Burma and Thailand could easily be severed."
In addition, control of the sea lanes around the Republic of
China (specifically, the Taiwan Straits) could deal a devas-
tating blow to the Japanese shipping of raw materials and
petroleum from Indonesia and the Middle East.
Traditional post-war relations with Taiwan have been
cordial, though not close. Japanese fraternity towards its
neighboring island nation was essentially a policy enforced
and dominated by the United States. Severe pressure was
applied by the U.S. from the beginning, including a subtle
threat that if Japan did not recognize the sovereignty of
Taiwan, the United States would not ratify the San Francisco
90Peace Treaty of 19 51. "Fearing to jeopardize the oppor-
tunity to obtain Japan's political and economic independence
under the San Francisco Treaty, he (Prime Minister Yoshida)
91
submitted to Arierican pressure." The subsequent implemen-
tation of the U.S. — Japan Security Treaty strengthened the
bond by implicitly including military ties for the defense
of Taiwan. The sum total result was a tacit acceptance of
89Shelton, C.Q., Taiwan, Rose or Thorn?
, p. 6, Army
War College, October 1974.







the "Two Chinas" policy and a long term conflict between
Japan and the People's Republic of China.
The "Nixon Shocks" of 19 71 angered the Japanese and did
much to overtly change her policy towards Taiwan. Nixon's
actual visit to Peking and the resultant normalization of
diplomatic relations between the United States and tlie PRC
was not the cause of Japanese ire. She v;as, however, deeply
disconcerted by the fact that the trip and its vital implica-
tions for Japan and Japanese security had not been discussed
with her leaders beforehand. In actuality, it is doubtful
that Japan herself had not already seriously considered the
economic and political advantages of rapprochement with
Comm^unist China, However, v.'ith the sudden change in American
policy came new questions regarding the status of Taiwan and
its security. It became extremely im.portant for Japan to be
reassured by the United States that Taiwan would not be
allowed to be used as an avenue of aggression "or for the
92
exertion of undue pressures by a mainland power".
By 1972, diplomatic ties between the Republic of China
and Japan were severed. Ambassadors were returned home;
Japan Air Lines flights to Taipei and China Air Lines
scheduled runs to Tokyo were terminated. The move was
initiated by Japan who realized that formal recognition of







in the development of friendlier political and economic
relations with the PRC. It appeared that political expedi-
ency outweighed traditional ties. However, if one observes
the conduct of affairs betv7een the two countries, it is
generally "business as usual" . Taipei is still one of the
most popular of Japanese tourist spots and trade between the
two nations remains open and acti.ve.
Japan's chief concern over Taiwan, as it is over Korea,
is not political; it is related almost solely to security.
Although a "free" Taiwan is both advantageous to and desired
by all nations of Asia (except the PRC who has been soft-
pedaling previous demands regarding Taiwan in favor of
renewed ties with the U.S.) few nations v;ould openly or
actively advocate such a policy because of the ensuing
damage to relations with mainland China. All the nations of
Asia, including Japan, also want to ensure the continued
presence of U.S. forces on Taiwan as an added safeguard
against a potential threat from the PRC.
On the other hand, the Soviet Union has little actual
interest in Taiwan. Publicly
,
they condemn U.S. military
presence in East Asia. Privately, they seem to find a
relatively strong U.S. presence on Taiwan preferable to any
further Chinese expansion. Again, given the conditions of
the Sino-Soviet conflict, there is also probably a fear of
having the Taiwan Straits being declared territorial waters.




Japan's relations with both Korea and Taiwan are enigmatic
Although both nations are perceived to be of great strategic
concern to Japan, little effort is being made by the Japanese
to stabilize the areas. Despite the fact that the two
countries are the keys to both U.S. and Japanese interests
in the Far East, Japan prefers to depend almost totally upon
the U.S. comiTiittment to guarantee that stability. Despite
the fact that further U.S. troop withdrawals threaten to
weaken that committment and despite the fact that both are
areas in which the United States would least like to be
engaged in a conflict due to the potential for direct
involvement by the Sino-Soviet power bloc, the Japanese
appear assured of the viability of their present relations.
Billions of yen each year are poured into trade investments
and into the national economies of South Korea and Taiwan
by both Japanese government and big business. Perhaps, the
Japanese have discovered that the key to overcoming military
weakness is to ensure economic dependence in an effort to
make Asia more hospitable.
B. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE USSR
Within the trends of broken alliances and shifting
loyalties, yesterday's enemy may very well become tomorrow's
ally. So the United States may attest when one observes
current Anierican relations with Germany and Japan thirty
years after defeating them in a bloody general war.
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Historically, Japan has feared and disliked Russia.
Politically, ideologically and culturally, the two countries
have been traditionally hostile. But in modern Japan, fears
and enmities are yielding to political and economic necessity
Despite their mutual hesitancy, Japan is attempting to
improve relations with the Soviet Union and the USSR is
highly receptive to the overtures. Aware of the increase
in Sino-Soviet influence in the Far East, Japan feels the
only means of ensuring a continued stability in Asia is to
cement friendships with both Communist pov/ers and to make an
overt enemy of neither. The Soviets, for their part, want
closer relations in an attempt to woo Japan away from the
93Chinese camp.
No peace treaty officially ending World War II hostili-
ties between Japan and the Soviet Union has ever been signed.
(The USSR was conspicuously absent at the signing of the
treaty at San Francisco in 1951.) A major obstacle in
concluding such a treaty has been the Soviet claim to the
Kurile Islands, that small chain located between Hokkaido and
the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to the Soviets, Japan
ceded all of the Kuriles and Sakhalin Island to the USSR as
a result of the San Francisco Conference and the Yalta
Agreement. Japan claims that the Kurile-Sakhalin cession
included the eighteen islands upwards from Uruppu, excluding






general/ the West supports the claim and agrees that the
disputed territory is an integral part of the Japanese home
islands. Although the Soviets had offered to negotiate for
the return of the Habomai Islands and Shiketan, discussions
regarding the Kuriles remained at an effective standstill
from 1956 until 1974.
Despite the fact that the Kurile issue is a hotly
debated one, the islands are seemingly of little strategic
import to either Japan or the Soviet Union. With the Soviet
presence on Sakhalin Island, in Vliidivostok and at Nakhodka,
actual Japanese possession of the Kuriles seems of little
significance as a matter of national security, despite the
fact that Kunashiri lies only eight miles from the coast of
Hokkaido.
However, the fishing grounds off the islands' shores
are lush and plentiful. One of the great barriers in
previous negotiations was Soviet seizure and confiscation
of Japanese fishing vessels operating in the Sea of Okhotsk,
off the Kurile coastlines. Finally, in January of 1974,
meetings on the "legality" of Japanese fishing and discus-
sions regarding the expansion of fishing rights, led to
renewed negotiations on the subject of the Kuriles. The
Soviets were amenable to the return of Shiketan and the
Habomais in return for concluding a formal peace treaty,
but remained adamant in their position regarding the Kuriles,
Some observers feel that this hard line attitude has been
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adopted by the Soviets "with the belief that any concession
on real estate anywhere would open a Pandora's box of
Chinese and other border claims against Moscow." " In any
event, negotiations have been deadlocked once again.
In addition, Japan is covetous of the wealth of
Siberian oil, timber, coal and natural gas so near to her
own shores. As discussed in Chapter II, the Japanese and
the Soviets initiated agreements for the exploration of
various natural resources in both Eastern Siberia and on
Sakhalin Island. However, the conclusion of these agree-
ments v/as hampered by continued tensions and mutual suspicion.
The Soviets wanted and needed Japanese capital, but subtly
feared contamination by the "Asian capitalists" . Japan
feared the "possible arbitrary actions by the Russians such
as violating contracts, not paying agreed prices, and
excluding the Japanese from sufficient inspecting facilities
95
on joint projects," in addition to fears of a further
96industrial build-up m Siberia. Despite these obstacles
the desire for and advantages of joint Siberian developm.ent
are still there. Although no firm agreements have been signed
94Pond, Elizabeth, "Japan and Russia: The View From
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or closed contracts written, the realities of obtaining a
near by, low cost source which could considerably reduce
Japan's dependence upon Canadian, American and Middle East
suppliers, is tempting.
Both an obstacle and an advantage to furthering Japanese
political/economic relations with the Soviet Union is the
Sino-Japanese rapprochement. Soviet leaders were both
angered and suspicious in 1972 when Japan formally normalized
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.
Consequently, the Soviets are intensely concerned with
preventing any further alliances between the two countries.
Their solution (especially since the January 1976 signing of
the "Amity Treaty" between Japan and the PRC) will most
likely be an active campaign, to woo Japan into the Russian
camp. In this respect, access to Siberia's natural resources
could be used as a lever to pressure Japan into further
concessions
.
At the same time, Japan has managed to maintain some
working leverage over the Soviets. Trade is not a
97The Japanese have since backed out of any firm coirariit-
m.ent to the Tyumen/Yakutia exploration program, probably
more due to the facts that 1) American oil companies have
declined an invitation to participate, 2) the Soviets have
failed to arrive at reasonable agreements regarding site
surveys, financing and volume of resources to be made
available for export and 3) there have been doubts about the
quality of Tyumen oil because of a suspected high sulfur
content. (Langdon, op. cit




98particularly important aspect. However, a need for
Japanese capital in the development of Siberia could prove
a valuable bargaining point in the future.
Secondly, there is the consideration of the potential
vulnerability of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and its support
facilities at Vladivostok. The Russians must rely upon the
Tsushima Straits between Korea and Honshu, and the Tsugaru
Straits, for access to the Sea of Japan (especially in the
event of a naval deployment against Communist China)
.
"Other routes to the open seas are available to the Russians,
but each has limiting factors that reduce the feasibility of
99its use."' If, after the Law of the Sea Conference, the
Tsugaru Straits become territorial rather than international
waters, or if there is a move to cem.ent relations between the
PRC and Japan even further, the Soviets could face a severe
blov7 to their Pacific Fleet mobility. Without such mobility
and/or the support facilities at Vladivostok, the "Soviets
could be hard pressed to protect the maritime Provinces, or
to bring military pressure to bear on China's southern flank.
Japanese good will... is therefore essential."
9 8
It is estimated that even by 1980, the Soviet Union
will account for less than five per cent of Japan's trade
(Sorenson, op. cit








The Japanese appear to view stable relations with the
Soviet Union as advantageous, but not critical. It is
highly improbable that they v;ould damage their partnership
with the United States or their rapprochement with the PRC
by engaging in any firm committments to or bilateral agree-
ments with, the Soviet Union.
C. COOPERATIVE ENEMIES: JAPAN AND THE PRC
From 1951 until September 29, 1972, relations with China
were distant, despite the fact that trade relations prospered,
a fact which emphasizes the Japanese government's policy of
separating economics from, politics. U.S. refusal to acknow-
ledge the Communist regiirie as China's legitimate governirient
and Japan's own "Two Chinas" policy proved to be the unbridge-
able gap to normalization of political relations. China
refused to accept economics without politics and accused
Japan of perpetuating instability in Asia by consorting with
the American "aggressors" and by supporting the government
of Chiang-Kai-shek. However, within Japan itself, a dilemma
was building. Trade with the PRC was important, but the
peace treaty with Nationalist China was seemingly inviolate.
"As Tokyo's China fever intensified, a schizophrenia
developed in Japan's body politic." Finally, in
September, 1972, Japan followed the American lead and
Meyer, Armin H., op. cit
. , p. 155.
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severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of mainland
China. The implications of that move are only beginning to
be felt.
In January 19 76, Japan concluded the much debated "Amity
Treaty" with the PRC, taking still another step toward full
102
accord with their largest Asian neighbor. The "/vniity
Treaty", despite its apparent impact upon Japan's position
on Taiv.'an deliberately avoided committing Japan to agreeing
unequivocally to the PRC stance that Taiwan is v;ithin the
territorial sovereignty of the mainland. Clause Three of
the original Sino-Japanese Coirmaunique of September 19 72
stated: "The Government of the People's Republic of China
reaffirms that Taiwan is an inalienable part of the territory
of the People's Republic of China. The Government of Japan
10 3fully understands and respects this stand..."
The economic aspects of rapprochement also have the
potential of being extremely lucrative for Japan. In
addition to the Taiching oil project (discussed in Chapter II)
102 The so-called "Amity Treaty" has been pending since
1972. The delay in ratification was caused by arbitration
over the PRC inserted "hegemony clause". China had insisted
the treaty include a clause denouncing the potential of any
nation to establish hegemony in Asia. It is interesting to
note that the title of "Peace Treaty" was deliberately
avoided. Also interesting is the fact that there is
virtually no mention of the traditional Chinese objection to
the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty.
103Ishikawa, Tadao, "The Normalization of Smo-Japanese
Relations," United States-Japanese Re lations, p. 15 5, edited




is the opportunity for an expanded trading partner. Japan
currently accounts for virtually 2 5 per cent of China's
total imports with the future predicting a significant
104increase. Also a problem, potentially resolved by the
new relations, is previous antagonism over fishing rights.
The PRC has barred Japanese fishing over the stretch of
coast from Shanghai to Chekiang provinces under the pretext
that the region has been declared a "military security area".
Japan, on the other hand, has viewed the act as an arbitrary
demarcation of international v/aters . Such problems as these
may be solved between two countries who now can communicate
openly and officially.
At initial glance, the benefits to China of diplomatic
norm^alization are much more obvious and tangible than those
to Japan. It has, at least superficially, solidified
Chinese claims regarding Taiwan and has improved here inter-
national maneuverability. Nevertheless, there are advantages
for Japan. The economic aspects have already been mentioned,
as well as the advantage of diplomatic "problem solving"
.
In addition, the move may enhance Japan's position on the
international scene. "Because of the emtergence of multi-
polar international situations, Japan can no longer completely





become more self-reliant in the pursuit of its national
105interests through diplomacy."
The disadvantage is obvious. Normalization of relations
with China can have a profound and damaging effect on
continued relations with the Soviet Union.
It appears that Japan, almost of necessity, is straddling
the political fence, striving to m.aintain close political
ties with the United States and her Western allies while, at
the same time, cultivating friendships among the Communist
states. Her basic dilemma is the absolute necessity of
closing the gap between former adversaries without being
inadvertently caught in the middle of the Sino-Soviet strain.
"But if they succeed in their diplomacy with Moscow and
Peking, while successfully maintaining close ties with the
United States, they v/ill have accomplished a major feat of
diplomacy
.
D. THE SINO-SOVIET CONFXICT
The nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict is the fine line
which Japan must tread between relations with the USSR and
with the PRC, The conflict had its genesis in the mid 19 50 's





106^ .^ t-cSorenson, op. cit., p. 55.
80

increasing dedication to peaceful coexistence as the main
line of Soviet policy"/ Mao-Tse-tung moved "to a more
107belligerent stance."
Intensified by the signing of the Moscow Treaty in 1963,
the rift developed into publicly acknov/ledged differences
in interpretation of CoraiT\unist doctrine. The ideological
split effectively destroyed the much touted myth of total
Communist unity and was destined to have an impact upon the
nations of Asia, including Japan.
The Sino-Soviet conflict, in its relation to Japan, is
both an advantage and a threat. The Japanese fear the
1 OPpossibility of the ideological schism becoming a "hot" war,
with the associated eventuality of being drawn into or
threatened by, open warfare on mainland Asia. Secondly, any
overtures by Japan toward one country are viewed with
109hostility and suspicion by the other. Thus, Japan must
tread warily, weighing the advantages and the risks of
better relations with each.
107Clemens
, V7 . C . , Jr . , The Arms Race and The Smo-Soviet
Relations
, The Hoover Institution, p. 43, 19 68.
10 8This is not an irrational fear. On several occasions
the split has erupted into border skirmishes.
109This could be the real reason for Japanese hesitancy
in committing themselves to the Tyumen project. Japanese
funding to build a new Trans-Siberian railroad could only
be looked upon as a threat by the Chinese who would view
any build-up in Eastern Siberia as military potential.
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On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet conflict serves as a
benefit. Each of the two Communist nations, seeking to
legitimize their pov/er, and their ideology, view Japan as
both the barrier to and the cornerstone of their interests
in the Jvsian sphere. If Japan is cautious, the split can
greatly increase her political maneuverability.
"... (N) egotiations about trade and development find Japan
with considerable ability to maneuver in the setting created
by the Sino-Soviet split." Thus, it may serve as a point
of leverage over which the Japanese may exert some control.
Secondly, the conflict ensures some semblance of
stability in East Asia by effectively reducing the perils
of a joint threat and by placing tacit controls on each of
the countries regarding any overtly aggressive or expansionist
policies. As long as the possibility of Sino-Soviet entente
remains remote, neither the Chinese nor the Soviets would
permit Asian hegemony by the other.
Kahn, op. cit. p. 174.
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V . ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FUTURE
In the past the Japanese had weathered, with
a minimum of disorder and lost motion such
traumatic shocks as ... the awful collapse
at the end of World War II. Since then
they had girded their economic and political
cause with consummate skill. Once again
stormy seas lay ahead, but there seem(s)




£^.^i™_§ tory of a Nation
Japan's future security posture is not a matter of clear-
cut choice. It involves a number of options and alternatives.
Any attempt to analyze these policy alternatives must include
an examination of 1) Japan's concept of her external inter-
ests, 2) her perceptions of the threats to those interests,
3) her viev/ of the U.S. security role and 4) the attitudes
of others tov/ards Japan and potential Japanese military
111power
.
Generally, Japan's future alternatives encompass five m.ajor
choices, any one or more of which might possibly be pre-
determined or made inevitable given a concomitant set of
circumstances and/or events. The five are:
1) continue to rely upon the support, security and






2) embark upon the pursuit of a policy of unarmed
neutrality,
3) look tov/ards the Soviet Union and/or the People's
Republic of China for direct security via formal alliances
and bilateral agreements,
4) embark upon a policy of total military independence
based on an all-out rearmament effort including the develop-
ment and acquisition of nuclear weapons,
5) consolidate Japan's national security interests
with those of the other Asian nations by means of multilateral
guarantees
.
Table IX establishes an a prior i level of plausibility
for each alternative and delineates the given set of events
or circumstances v/hich could lead to the selection of that
alternative as a m.atter of policy. First, the general feasi-
bility of each major alternative will be discussed followed
by an examination of the potential circumstances.
1 . Continued Reliance Upon the U.S.
A continued reliance upon the United States is the
most plausible and seemingly, the most rational alternative.
Despite Japan's increasing desire for and policy moves
towards a greater degree of autonomy, the differences be-
tween U.S. and Japanese perceptions regarding security and
defense are narrowing somewhat and the ones that remain show
greater hope of accommodation. In addition, Japan would not
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unless she were both completely v/illing to and capable of
assuming the total responsibility for her own defense. The
limitations to the total independence approach were delineated
in Chapter III and encompass far more than mere technological
ability and prowess.
Nevertheless, this alternative does depend upon the
existence of a base case, a scenario v7hose chief character-
istics rely upon the success of detente, continued economic
prosperity and an acceptable level of political and military
stability in East Asia, as well as upon the maintenance of
internal Japanese pov/er by the Ldberal Democratic Party. To
a slightly lesser extent, the realities of the Sino-Soviet
conflict, the unresolved problem of Korea and the possibili-
ties of these areas of tension becoming areas of overt hos-
tilities, will force the Japanese to reassess their physical
vulnerabilities. Conversely, renewed rapprochement between
the Chinese and the Soviets could lead the Japanese to per-
ceive a dual threat. Unlike Europe, Japan has two major
Communist powers bordering her shores. The Treaty has worked
effectively for both Japan and the United States for twenty-
112five years; there is no reason, given the base case, V7hy
it cannot continue to be a viable relationship into the 19 80 's.
112Despite the charges of a "free ride" by Americans and
the feeling that the Treaty is a "necessary evil" by the
Japanese, no one can dispute the fact that it's existence has




Some experts say that Japan is Asian merely by an
accident of geography, that her economic, political, and
113
social out].ook is almost totally Western m nature.
Others say that the Japanese, traditionally insular, histor-
ically isolated from the international scene, have been con-
fused by the Western influence. Desirous of both maintaining
tradition and pursuing the "economic miracle", the Japanese
are torn and therefore, unpredictable. A new surge of
Japanese traditionalism (nationalism, if you wish) , could
spawn the end of the Treaty partnership.
In any event, assuming the base case and the con-
tinuation of the Treaty, major readjustments v^ould have to
be made, by both sides, for it to remain a viable agreement.
A new treaty would be drafted, reducing U.S. visible prescence
to an absolute minimum, delineating specific terms of the
U.S. defense committm^ent and establishing the boundaries of
Japanese defense responsibilities. Such a revision would
do much to allay TUiierican fears of another Vietnam and to
decrease the feeling by many Japanese that the Treaty remains
an unwelcome vestige of the Occupation.
2 . Unarm.ed Neutrality
Unarmed neutrality is a policy often touted by the
minority political parties. It is a policy that apparently
113Reischauer, personal interview, 15 September 19 7 5
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stems from the roots of a people steeped in war guilt and a
feeling of strong antipathy to military power. Although
Japan is becoming increasingly more self-confident and is
exhibiting a new concern for "things Japanese", this new
nationalism "correlates not with hawkish views on defense,
but rather with neutralism
. . . and hostility to both the
114SDF and American bases." In recent years the Nixon doc-
trine and its demands for "burden-sharing" generated a new
spate of anti-militarism V7hich could prove strong enough to
turn the Japanese populace away from the SDF and the Mutual
Security Treaty.
In addition, effective detente v.'ith the USSR and the
PRC will reduce any apparent need for expansion of the Self
Defense Force or any substantial military force, domestic
or foreign. Complete U.S. troop withdrawal from Japan coupled
with the loss of LDP power could make such a policy of
neutrality highly feasible.
However, neutrality is only possible if Japan can
make the assumption that there is a minimal threat to her
own security and can be tolerated only if Japan presents
virtually no threat to anyone else. This era of multilater-
alism, of powers and superpowers, appears to make this alter-
native less feasible. Under consideration must be: 1) Japan's
economic superpov/er status and the direct effect her economic
Mendel, op. cit
. , p. 157
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policies have on other nations, 2) the fact that the United
States is no longer the strategic force in the Western
Pacific and 3) the fact that Japan has reached a point in
her status where she must assume the responsibilities of a
major power, not withdraw from them.
3 . Rearmam.ent and Nuclear Weapons
The policy choice most feared by all nations involved
directly or indirectly, with Japan, is the possibility of
opting for full-scale rearmament. The practical obstacles
to rearmament and nuclear possession v^ere discussed in
Chapter III. However, an international scenario vv^hich strays
from the base case might make these practical barriers far
less significant.
In recent years, Japan has discovered that her exter-
nal interests are no longer limited to the Korean Peninsula,
Taiwan and the Sea of Japan. Her unbridled economic growth
has, of necessity, expanded both her sphere of influence and
her area of interest to Southeast Asia, the Middle East, even
to Europe and North Tunerica. Her economic status and power
have opened opportunities to Japan often available only to
those nations with military power sufficient to secure and
protect them. Herman Kahn, for example, does not believe
that Japan will remain satisfied v/ith her secondary military
115 . .
role and traditional "low posture" policy. Another critic
115Kahn does stop short of "predicting" a resurgence of
militarism. He m.erely classes Japan as a potential "super-
state", but does not commit himself to asserting what kind
of superstate, purely economic/technological, or otherv/ise.
( The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response )
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says "economic power alone cannot afford the basis for an
adequate foreign policy. It assumes that Japan's economic
growth poses no threat or challenge to the rest of the world.
... On the other hand, a policy dependent upon the U.S. secur-
ity guarantee may prove too restrictive or impermanent for
a Japan bent on world power." Their low risk, lov; posture,
post-war policy has worked exceedingly vjell for them. How-
ever, this trend of adapting and reacting solely to outside
pressures may be forced to give v/ay to an active, initiative
policy in the 1980 's. The need for protection of raw
material sources, supplies and routes must be guaranteed.
If there comes a time when the sea lanes fall into hostile
hands, they can only be secured by force. The crucial in-
gredient to the avoidance of the rearmament choice lies in
no
the American committment. Further indications ~ of actual
or perceived U.S. failure to meet the conunittm.ent, total U.S.
withdrawal from the Western Pacific, or a Japanese lack of
faith in that committment would, inevitably, lead to Japan's
seeking security elsev;here, most probably in her ov/n arms.
Without the 7\inerican comm.ittment , the probability of a nev;
Korean War increases, as does the heretofore remote possi-











Once the decision to rearm has been made, the logical
extension is to the acquisition of nuclear arms, especially
if given the case of continued proliferation among the Third
World nations. If Japan, for any reason, caused by any
external or internal circumstance, insists upon or is forced
into embarking on a totally independent defense policy, she
would be signalling a policy of "full scale rearmament
119including the production of nuclear weapons."'
4 . Bilateral Agreements
Currently, Japanese overtures towards Communist China
and the Soviet Union have been in the realm of cultural and
economic exchanges as discussed in Chapters II and IV. Poli-
tical agreements, although important and marking a slight
shift in post-v/ar Japanese policy, have not been of any
120intrinsic substance and have m no way implied any
resemblance to military alliances or security pacts.
Closer ties with her former enemies is inevitable,
and, in the case of certain diplomatic and economic agreem.ents,
highly beneficial. The 1980 's will definitely mark an era
of lesser economic dependence upon the Middle East, most
probcibly via agreements for Tyumen oil v/ith the Soviet Union
119Stanford Research Institute, op. cit
.
, p. 154.
120The most notable exception being the signing of the
"amity treaty" with the PRC. The consequences of this docu-
ment have the potential of being far reaching ones.
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and/or developments of the Taiching oil fields in China.
Both nations will £ictively step up their campaigns for
closer relations with Japan in hopes of reducing the other's
121level of Asian influence. ' Former Ambassador Reischauer
sees a new era of relations between Japan, the Soviet Union
and the PRC, but believes that only total abandonment by the
United States could give Japan impetus enough to turn to
the Chinese or the Soviets. "...(E) von if Japan and the
United States should drift apart . . . neither is likely to
develop a relationship with China or the Soviet Union that
could be a substitute for their present relationship with
122
each other."
^ • Mu 11 i 1 atera 1 Agre ernent s
Japanese are taught from childhood to avoid shame
and embarrassment and to be highly conscious of the esteem
in which others hold them. "This . . . makes the individual
Japanese a very self-conscious person. 'What will they
think of me?' is always the first thought. ... Even the most
humble Japanese feels himself to be on a stage before his
123fellow countrymen and the whole world." ' This feeling of
121
' The 1980's will most likely bring a satisfactory
agreement regarding the Northern Territories. However,
rather than being of any real political or military sub-
stance, such an agreement would be the "leverage" exerted
by the Soviets for diplomatic or economic gain.




12 3Reischauer, Edwin 0., United States and Japan , p. 143,
The Viking Press, 1968.
93

self-consciousness has overflowed into postwar Japanese
policy. The desire to be friends to all and enemies to none,
coupled with the remnants of war guilt, have bred a Japan
strongly cognizant of world opinion, especially among the
nations of Asia which she helped to decimate some thirty
years ago. However, this concern for Asia is recent and has
manifested itself in terms of aid, investment and economic
assistance, not in terms of any resurgence of pan-Asian
nationalism or spirit of "Asia for the Asians." In reality,
Japan has very little in common, socially or economically,
with her Asian neighbors. The prospects for any regional
security pact or multilateral agreements in the 1980 's are
the most remote. First of all, the vestiges of fear, sus-
picion and caution regarding Japan and Japanese enterprise
remain in the minds of a once defeated Asia. Potential
rearmament is the crux of this fear. The slightest growth
or modernization within the Self-Defense Forces raises the
perennial spectre of resurgent Japanese militarism. The
eventuality of a regional security pact "seems conceivable
only as a defensive response to serious threats or actions
originating directly or indirectly from one of the two prin-
cipal Communist pov/ers . " As the undisputed "key to the
Pacific", any such arrangement without agreed upon Japanese
leadership would be doomed to failure.






For Japan's part, it would require an exceedingly
severe threat to her physical or economic well-being to
prompt such a move. Any pact with the potential to involve
her in unwanted limited wars in Southern Asia would be
unacceptable to the Japanese people.
B. THE CIRCUxMSTANCES
It would be virtually impossible, given the constraints
of time and space, to develop a full scenario under which
each of the causal circumstances in Table IX could occur.
Suffice it to say that each event or circumstance is within
the realm of plausibility and each event or circumstance,
taken singly or in multiples, could either stabilize or
destroy the base case. No attempt will be made to predict
the circumstance leading to the alternative. Instead, given
the background of Chapters I through V, it is believed that
a set of circumstances can be interpreted as a rational in-
dicator of the most plausible alternative. (Table IX)
1. The Economic Outlook
Japan's economic "miracle" of the 1950 's and 19 50 's
cannot be maintained. The realities of an effectively closed
technology gap, the utilization of critically needed oil
resources as a political weapon and the vagaries of an inter-
national finance situation that breeds inflation-recession-
inflation, will prohibit a continued ten per cent per annum




upheaval will assure Japan of relative economic stability,
probably in the realm of a four to five per cent per annum
4-v, 126growth.
The 19 80 's will mark a concerted effort by Japan to
further diversify her sources of raw materials, maximize
her economic options and reduce her market dependency upon
the United States. Whereas trade has been Japan's lifc-:blood
in the past, continued economic viability will entail de-
tailed efforts to overcome her present economic and resource
problems. Such efforts V7ill require a greater expenditure
of Research and Development funds (probably in excess of
tV70 per cent of the GNP) . Another option would be for Japan
to engage in exploratory mining operations off the contin-
ental shelf in search of oil and gas deposits. Similar ex-
plore tions could be anticipated v;ithin Japanese territorial
waters (recently extended to twelve miles)
.
Diversification of sources will, of necessity, also
mean an expanded effort to achieve siabstitutes v;ith available
resources. Such an R&D effort would include methods to
125
It should be noted that total economic upheaval is
not as implausible as it may sound. Given Japan's extreme
economic vulnerabilities, continued inflation, severance of
supply routes or a prolonged "oil crisis" akin to that ex-
perienced in 1973, industrial production could come to a
virtual standstill.
Even at this rate, Japan would surpass the Soviet
Union by the early 19 80 's (Paige, F.D., U.S . - Japanese Re-





reduce the critical need for oil, such as in the development
of non~petroleurn based synthetics (e.g. organic plastics),
127
and in the employment of nuclear/solar energy.
Trade with the United States will begin to achieve
a more equitable balance, hopefully easing past and current
tensions in this regard. The Japan Economic Research Center
generally has predicted the following:
TABLE X
] 2 8Balance of Trade, 1980 Projected (in $ x mi llion) '
% Increase
1960 1920 198 1960-70 3^970" 8
TRA.DE
BALANCE 440 1,410 5,795
Japan exports
to the U.S.
(fob) 2,510 6,020 26,751 18.4 16.1
Japan imports
from the
U.S. 2,070 4,610 20,956 12.4 16.1
A new, more acceptable balance of trade must be achieved and
maintained. Any severe economic trauma, such as a trade war,
could serve to effect a permanent, irreparable schism in the
U.S. -Japan partnership.
127One source speculates that Japan is technologically
capable of engaging in experimentation with controlled
nuclear fusion for peaceful purposes (Stanford Research
Institute, op. cit.
, p. 331) .
12 8Japan Economic Research Center, "Japan's Economy in
1980 in the Global Context," p. 12, March 1972.
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Japan will reduce somewhat, her near total dependence
upon the U.S. market. Trade '.vith the Soviet Union, the PRC
and the lesser nations of Asia v;ill increase significantly
but will not constitute an adequate alternative to the U.S.
Barring a radical change from the base case, such as open
warfare in East Asia, Japan's economic stability is rela-
tively assured, despite continued pressures and external
demands
.
2 . Political Determinan ts
Despite the historic success of the LDP, the party
has no monopoly on the future. Its majority is being stead-
ily eroded v;ithin the Diet and dissatisfaction with its
handling of welfare policies such as pollution, the housing
shortage, inflation a.nd social security is causing it to
lose its pov/er with the Japanese people.
Odds favor an end to LDP majority in the Diet upper
house, but the Party V7ill more than li.kely retain the lower
house until the mid 1980 's. Tables XI and XII indicate the
general decline of LDP and DSP majorities. What they do
not indicate however, is the steady erosion of LDP polling
power. Disenchantment with the ruling LDP is leading to a
slow, but steadily creeping increse in Socialist and Communist
seat gains, despite the fact that the majority of Japanese
polled fear and dislike any radically oriented party. The
JSP is showing a marked tendency towards moderation and





ND. OF ELEC'i'ED REPS IN DIET BY PARTY (1955 - 1972) 129
APR MAY NOV NOV jm DEC DEC
PARTY 1955 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972
LIBERAL DH>B 297^ 287 296 283 277 288 271
SOCIALIST 156^ 166 145 144 140 90 118
COMMUNIST 2 1 3 5 5 14 38
KOMEITO 25 47 29
DEM SOCIALIST 17 23 30 31 19
others'^ 8 13 6 12 9 16 14
TOTAL 463 467 467 467 486 486 489
includes -the conbined totals of two conser\'ative parties
prior to their merger into a single party in Nov. 1955.
includes the combined totals of two socialist factions that
were merged in October 1955.
cincludes minor parties and mdepejidents









APR J^^M NOV NOV JAN DEC DEC
PARTY 1955 1958 1960 1963 1967 1969 1972
LIBERATE DE^'S
Seats: 63.6 61.5 63.4 60.6 57.0 59.3 55.0
Votes: 63.2 57.8 57.6 54.7 48.8 47.6 46.9
SOCIALIST
33.4 35.5 31.0 30.8 28.8 18.5Seats: 24.0
Vot£s
:
29.2 32.9 27.6 29.0 27.9 21.4 21.9
OO^^IUNIST
Seats 0.4 0.2 0.6 1.0 1.0 2.9 7.7









Seats: 3.6 4.9 6.2 6.4 3.9
Votes 8.8 7.4 7.4 7.7 7.0
OTHERS
Seats: 2.5 2.7 1.3 2.5 1.9 3.3 3.3
Votes 5.6 6.7 3.2 4.9 5.8 5.5 5.3




By 1980 the LDP will most likely retain enough
majority to maintain governmental control. However, by the
mid 1980 's an LDP/Socialist coalition government is a highly
plausible occurrence, but one v;hich does not necessarily
have to m.ean a sudden or drastic shift in policy. The
result, of necessity, w^ould be a middle-of-the-road govern-
ment, leading essentially to a general policy of neutrality.
Neutrality would not however, have to be a force to abrogate
the Mutual Security Treaty. Although there would be no
physical U.S. presence, the likelihood exists for the main-
tenance of "emergency bases" for use in a crisis and adher-
ence to the U.S. comm.ittment for nuclear and long-range
naval protection.
Any other political alignment is unfeasible, barring
a drastic political or economic upheaval. A united front
between the JSP and the JCP is the most im^plausible future
given the extent of internal factionalism within both parties,
and the deep fear of the JSP of Communist ideological
extremism.
It should be noted that despite the erosion of LDP
polling power, subtle changes in policy (especially domestic
affairs) could shift the balance back to LDP favor.
^ • The Four Power Balance
The most significant stabilizing force in Northeast
Asia for the past thirty years has been the maintenance of
a relatively effective four power balance between Japan, the
United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of
101

China. The chief contributors to securing and maintaining
that balance have been the U.S. -Japan alliance on the one
hand and the Sino-Soviet conflict on the other.
The fear of Asian "encirclement" by one Communist
power against the other has achieved a level of stability
with its own built-in guarantees. Any aggressive, expan-
sionist m.ove on the part of one is assured of a hostile
reaction by the other. Since neither country appears to be
willing to involve itself in an extended regional conflict
with the attendant possibility of a direct military confron-
tation, both the PRC and the Soviet Union maintain relatively
"low key" postures in regard to their Asian interests.
Secondly, Japan has often been considered the "key"
to the Pacific balance, both diplomatically and economically.
The U.S. — Japan alliance has heretofore prevented Japan
from becoming an unwilling pawn in any attempt to disturb
that balance. Despite Soviet and Chinese protests regarding
U.S. military presence in Japan (and elsewhere in East Asia),
such a presence is apparently preferable to the creation of
a void into which their Comniunist counterpart could move.
The crucial element in preserving the power stability
into the 19 80's is the cooperation of all four countries
involved. Withdrawal of the U.S. committment, an appreciable
increase in Sino-Soviet hostilities or conversely, a Sino-
Soviet entente, could create an instability leading eventually
to one power hegemony in Northeast Asia, Additionally,
actual or perceived Japanese full-scale rearmament would be
102

a force so disruptive to the balance as to almost guarantee
a resulting Sino-Soviet "defensive" entente.
4 . The Military Outlook and Nuclear Proliferation
The fact that the mission of Japan's Self-Defense
Forces has remained virtually unchanged since 1957, as well
as the already mentioned constitutional status, size con-
straints and available weaponry, are limiting factors in
. . . 131
assessing its future capabilities." However, its struc-
ture, size and composition will obviously be adapted to Japan's
1980 's defense policy. Since 1945, defense has been one of
the lowest priorities, encompassing less than one per cent
of the GNP, and a topic more often avoided than discussed.
Barring the less feasible, drastic circumstances far
outside the base case, such as complete v^;ithdrawal of all
mobile U.S. forces from the Pacific, open V7arfare on main-
land Jisia, or the seizure of Taiwan or Korea, Japan in the
1980 's will probably prefer to rem^ain economically powerful
and militarily v;eak. This is not to say that there will
not be expansion and modernization of existing forces, only
that for the present and for the near future, full scale
rearmament and possession of nuclear weapons is not a
logical or rational option.
The complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Japanese soil
132




132Even Seventh Fleet ships would most logically operate
from Japanese ovmed and maintained support centers.
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The loss of Japan and Okinawa as "staging areas" would not,
however, limit the effectiveness of U.S. forces. Mobility
could be maintained by falling back to Guam, Tinian and
Saipan. However, the protracted withdrav/al of U.S. forces
from Japanese soil v/ill continue to be a force to lend
emphasis and impetus to Japan's need for better home island
defense such as ASW, harbor protection and close-in air
support. The Constitutional ban against offensive forces
and weapons v;ill stand, and, although total troop strength
will not increase dramatically, it is anticipated that the
Japanese will develop a more modern and better equipped
force.
One of Japan's most serious worries is in regard to
continued nuclear proliferation. The explosion of a nuclear
device by India vjas of great concern to Japan. Although
stolid on their three-point non-nuclear policy, further
nuclear proliferation by Third World nations and the asso-
ciated increased risks of irresponsible use of such v/eapons,
might very well cause Japan to think in terms of defensive
nukes if for no other reason than diplomatic "show". Other
rationale for Japan to go nuclear include 1) the existence
of a full-fledged nuclear capability, including adequate
delivery systems by Communist China or 2) deterioration or
withdrawal of the American nuclear "umbrella". If that
"umbrella" remains assured, for the foreseeable future Japan
will eschew nuclear v;eapons for one main reason — her con-
centration of population and industry and her vulnerabilities
104

as an island nation virtually prohibit any second-strike
capability. Therefore, Japan's logical assumption is that
she would be far better off and far less a potential target
133if she had no nuclear capability v;hatsoever. At the same
time, polls conducted in the late 1960 's of Japanese graduate
students, revealed the belief that Japan would acquire nuclear
weapons within, at the most, fifteen years. Most of the
individuals polled indicated that this would occur after
134West Germany or India created a precedent. In a separate
Japan-v/ide poll conducted by the Japan Research Center in
1971, 43 per cent of the respondents believed that- Japan
would acquire nuclear weapons of her own in the not too dis-
tant future, mcore rapidly if the U.S. withdrcv>7 its nuclear
135protection. The attitude appears to be greatly affected
by the m.anner in which the question is asked. If asked if
Japan w_ill go nuclear, the majority invariably respond in the
affirmative. If asked if Japan should go nuclear, the re-
sults are most often similar to those presented in Table XIII.
133This policy has extended to forbidding the introduction
of nuclear weapons into Japan by U.S. forces, even to the point
of prohibiting port visits by U.S. nuclear- powered ships. In
that respect, it is interesting to note former Ambassador
Armin Meyer's observation that, at the same time that the
Japanese were building their own nuclear-pov/ered comimercial
ship, the MUTSU, at a Northern port, public outcries and
media pressures forbade the U.S. nuclear-powered commercial










JAPANESE OPINIONS ON NUCLEAR V7EAP0NS "'" "^
^
Q . Do you thin lc Japan should have nuclear weapons ?
DEC JUL
1970 1971
Japan should have nuclear weapons 7% 5%
Introduction of nukes is acceptable
but Japan should not have her ov/n 6 4
Japan should seek security under
the nuclear umbrella of her
allies v/ithout allowing either
domestic possession or
introduction 9 8
Nuclear weapons are not necessary
for the security of the nation 52 55
Other reply 1 1
Don't Know 25 27
It appears that extensive nuclear proliferation, a major
internal political shift or serious and disruptive events
on the international scene v;ill be the only rationale for
Japan's possession of nuclear v/eapons in the near future.
5. The Case of Taiwan and Korea
In this era of nuclear weapons and long-range de-
livery systems, Korea and Taiwan are no longer of intrinsic
137




p. 27. Survey conducted by the
Japan Research Center, Decerriber 1970 and July 1971.
137Reischauer, personal interview, 15 September 1975.
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indicate that they are both still areas of primary interest
and concern, chiefly because of Japan's fear of Communist
domination of either area. Therefore, U.S. policy towards
and interest in both nations is extremely important to Japan.
Despite the death of Chiang-Kai-shek and the new
American rapport with the PRC, U.S. policy toward Taiwan
remains essentially the same. The Chinese want the total
removal of U.S. troops from Taiwan; the Soviets prefer to
see them remain. China insists upon her claim to Taiv;an as
an integral part of the mainland; the Soviets prefer to keep
the issue of Taiwan ownership open in order to neutralize,
or at least curtail, the potential increase of Chinese power
138
and influence in Asia. It appears that the future of
Taiwan is a matter over which Japan still displays a great
deal of concern and over which they have very little control.
The key, again, is the U.S. committment, a committm.ent which
is subtly decreasing. The solution to the problem in the
viev7 of one observer is to make Taiwan a formal, interna-
tionally administered neutral state, withdrawing U.S. troops
139
and placing it under the jurisdiction of the United Nations.
With or without such a move, mainland China is not
likely to risk major power, military confrontation over the








island. Since Sino-American rapprochement, the Mao regime
has soft-pedaled their vocal claims and demands over the
island and, barring unforeseen circumstances, are unlikely
to avidly pursue them in the near future.
Korea, hov/ever, presents a slightly different situa-
tion. Ever fluctuating between relative peace and threatened
"hot" war, Korea is the tinderbox which has the potential of
igniting a mainland Asia confrontation. Although actual
U.S. troop force is not an absolute necessity, the mainten-
ance of the American committment there is vital. Should
the U.S. withdraw their complete protection and hostilities
flare on the peninsula, Korea could easily become the stage
for a series of major power confrontations and power plays.
Japan would watch these occurrences v.'ith trepidation and
likely lose faith in the U.S. willingness to respond to her
security needs. The result could be rearm.ament, a schism,
in U.S. -Japan relations, political turmoil and a force
strong enough to disrupt the entire balance in Northeast
Asia.
6. The U.S. Committment
As has been mentioned throughout, the U.S. committ-
ment is the vital force behind continued stability in North-
east Asia in general and in Japan in particular. In his
delineation of the "New Pacific Doctrine" President Ford
pronounced American strength as "basic to any balance of




of our Pacific strategy." His "new" doctrine is admirable
but is directly based upon the assumption that Congress and
the American people will continue to support military strength
in an area where Vietnam remains a stigma. The war in South-
east Asia effectively weakened U.S. influence in the Pacific,
both in terms of our willingness to protect our interests
there and in terms of our Pacific allies' faith in our
willingness to do so. Crisis intervention has become
141
anathema to the American people.
The result has been a new trepidation on the part of
our Pacific allies in fully trusting to the committment for
their security. For example, one of the most staunch anti-
Communist regimes in Asia v;as represented by Filipino Presi-
dent Marcos; yet, very shortly after the fall of Vietnam and
Cambodia, Marcos was observed shaking hands at Peking airport
vs?ith former Prem.ier Chou-En-lai, and making new overtures
to "close the gap" between China and the Philippines.
The secret to the viability of the future U.S. corrjnitt-
ment to Asia appears to lie in the dangers of over-reaction.
The U.S. must accept Vietnam for what it was, a probable
error in overall judgment and short-range policy goals,
and not allow the Southeast Asia experience to color the
Speech by U.S. President Ford in Hawaii, 7 Dec 1975.
141Recent public and media outcries over the extension
of military aid to Angola during the recent crisis in Angola
attest to this fact.
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entire conduct of future foreign and defense policy. The
key is to realize V7here American interests lie and resolve
to protect and secure those interests (namely, Japan)
.
The original hypothesis of this research theorized
that the defense and foreign policy role Japan chooses to play
in the 1980 's would be the key to future American defense
policy in Asia. The conclusion has since been reached that
it is the converse that is true. The 1980 's role of the
U.S. in Asia, Japanese (and adversary) perceptions of that
role, and the actual and perceived effectiveness of the
committment will be the pivot upon which Japanese policy
alternatives v;ill turn.
Revision of the Security Treaty, Japanese option for
rearmament and nuclear v;eapons (considered the most desta-
bilizing alternatives) , and the eventuality of overt hostility
toward the United States, all depend upon American adherence
to the coimnittment to protect Japanese territorial integrity,
economic viability, security of her supply routes and the
security of neighboring nations Japan perceives as vital
(specifically, Korea and Taiwan)
.
Physical basing of U.S. troops in the Japanese home-
land is no longer a vital determinant and it is expected that
the U.S. v;ill continue its protracted withdrawal with the
full approval of the Japanese government, with all troops
departed by 1980. The Seventh Fleet would remain as a
vestige of physical presence (and to lend visibility to
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the verbal committment) and would operate from Japanese
maintained support facilities at Yokosuka and Sasebo. The
U.S. must and, it is felt, will, reassert and reemphasize
the nuclear "umiirella" but will continue to be prohibited
to introduce such weapons into the Japanese home islands.
By the early 1980 's Americans will most likely take
the initiative and make overtures to have the Mutual Security
Treaty revised to reflect their updated status of full part-
ner in Japan's defense rather than the paternalistic leader
of Japan's policy as implied in the past. American leaders
will continue to urge the up-dating and modernization of
the Self Defense Forces but emphasize the need to keep
increased domestic defense capabilities relatively low key
in order to avoid the fears or suspicions of a resurgent
Japanese militarism.
Barring sudden or extreme shifts in U.S. leadership,
total withdrawal from the Pacific theater or total abroga-
tion of the committment should not be a danger. Vietnam will
be put behind us and the U.S. -Japanese tensions of the
1970 's, rather than marking the end of the U.S. -Japan alli-
ance should prove to mark the beginning of a new understanding




When a celestial object such as a rising
sun is near the horizon, it appears to be
a great deal larger than v/hen it is at its
zenith. But the observer should be cau-
tioned that this is an illusion. It would
be a great mistake in the case of Japan to
assume that the rising sun has reached its
zenith. Rather the opposite; it has just
begun its climb. How brightly, where and
when and how long it is going to shine are





Japan's traditional post-war policies are becoming
increasingly m.ore autonomous from those of the United States,
despite the fact that her defense policy has remained firmly
linked to the U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty. Her future,
as the above quote implies, is an open issue and the alterna-
tives available to her are diverse. Each option v;ill have
a wide range of causes and an even wider range of effects,
but it will be the continued stability and validity of the
American cornmittment in East Asia that will be the ultimate
determinant of the alternative selected.
Three major aspects of Japan's domestic and foreign
policy play the role of key elements in any future decision.
1) The Japanese economy has virtually dictated the
overall conduct of Japan's post-war policies. The absolute
need to guarantee her economic viability, the security of
the sea lanes and sources of energy and resource supply,
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will continue to be a major policy determinant in the future.
2) Japan's defense posture, despite internal and
external pressures to the contrary, has generally been pre-
dicated upon a concept of minimum defense. Her 1980 's
security policies will hinge directly upon the effectiveness
of the U.S. committment as both a strategic deterrent force
and as a means for ensuring Japan's economic stability.
Actual or perceived threats to that stability, without the
guarantees tacitly inherent in the U.S. committment, could
easily cause a drastic shift in the minimum defense concept.
3) Japan's perceptions of the "balance of power"
in Asia will also have a profound effect on her policy options
A major factor in Japan's political "independence" from the
United States, is her new relations with the nations of Asia
perceptibly imiportant to Japan in preserving her status and
maintaining stability in the Far East. Specifically included
must be an analysis of Japan's rapprochement with the USSR
and with mainland China as well as the role and status of
the two countries she considers to be primary threats to
her security — Korea and Taiwan.
Japan's future policy alternatives encompass a wide range
of options, each one dependent upon a given set of circum-
stances or events v/hich could conceivably make any one policy
choice inevitable. Nearly all of these pivotal circumstances
and events revolve, directly or indirectly, around the main-
tenance of a credible committment by the U.S. to Japan and
her allies in East Asia.
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It should well be noted that should the committment fail,
either overtly or in the eyes of our allies or our adver-
saries, the consequences could prove to be severe. The
disruption of the current level of stability in East Asia
could lead to one-pov;er hegemony, Japanese rearmament, and/or
further nuclear proliferation. In addition, there remains
the possibility of arriving at a new adversary-oriented,
strategic maritime balance in the VJestern Pacific. Such a
situation would leave a poorly prepared, ill-equipped Japan
in the center.
Japan is the only East Asian nation intrinsically impor-
tant to the United States. In analyzing current and projected
Japanese policy, the author has emphasized both her vital
need for a security she is ill-equipped to provide and her
new desires for autonomy from U.S. political domination. The
United States must assist Japan in attaining her desired
goals in an effort to maintain an economically stable, non-
hostile Japan. Hov/ever, the analysis of the research com-
pleted in the writing of this thesis also leads the author
to firmly believe that this base case will be the future case
only if the United States continues to openly acknowledge
Japan's importance to the Western world and maintains firm






LIBERAL DEiMOCrvATIC PARTY (LDP)
Membership — approximately 2 million registered
The Liberal Democratic Party has maintained control of
the Government of Japan since 19 55, the year in which three
separate parties, the Liberal, the Progressive and the
Cooperative were merged. It is essentially a conservative
party represented and supported by big business interests
and the majority of rural voters. Its leadership is gener-
ally drawn from, the business and civil service corrjr.unities
and is considered to have the "highest educated" membership.
Party emphasis has concentrated on the fullest develop-
ment of the economy and of private enterprise through direct
assistance and government regulation. It has stressed the
development and modernization of heavy industry and, in the
past, has generally relegated social welfare problems to a
lesser priority. The LDP is unitedly pro-AiTierican supports
the U.S. "Japan Mutual Security Treaty, but appears widely
divided on other issues of foreign policy.
142 . . .Sources for information on political parties were:




78 and United States ~ Japanese Political Relations, Special
Report 1^ 7, p. 51-67, Georgetov/n University for Strategic
Studies, May 19 68.
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TI-IE JAPAN SOCIALIST PARTY (JSP)
Membership — approximately 500,000 registered
The JSP constitutes the largest opposition party, but
has only once been able to hold power (for nine months in
the period 1947-1948 in the form of a coalition government)
.
Despite a right wing breakaway in 1960, the JSP remains
severely ideologically factioned. Three major internal
groups can be identified: the leftists, v/ho continue to
emphasize "class warfare" as a goal, the rightists, a more
moderate group emphasizing less doctrinaire problems, and the
centrists, a combination of the left and the right. The
party leadership tends to fall under the leftist faction.
The majority of party support is obtained from labor organi-
zations, chiefly from SOHYO, the largest Japanese labor
federation.
Regarding defense policy, the JSP generally opposes
foreign basing, is anti-Self Defense Force, wants the abro-
gation of the U.S. -Japan Security Treaty and supports a
policy of unarmed neutrality.
Although not united on foreign policy issues, the party
has proclaimed support for the conclusion of peace and non-
aggression treaties v;ith the USSR and the PRC. The Japan
Socialist Party also touts the necessity for the re-unifica-
tion of the Korean Peninsula.
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THE JAPAIT COMMUNIST PARTY (JCP )
Membership - actual membership is unknown but has been
estimated at 300,000
In existence since 1922, the JCP v/as not legally consti-
tuted until 1945. Historically moderate and unaligned, the
party received some popular support until it became engaged
in violent, Stalinist activities in the 1950 's. Today, the
members are considered to be rigid, hard-line Marxian ideo-
logists, although still effectively dissociated from either
Moscow or Peking. Its support among the farmers and the
educated is virtually non-existent and labor support is small
As regards national security, the JCP calls for the dis-
banding of the SDF and full support of Article IX of the 1946
Constitution. It demands the abrogation of the U.S. -Japan
Security Treaty, the v^ithdrawal of all U.S. troops from
Asia and espouses the advantages of unarmed neutrality.
THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST PARTY (DSP)
Membership — approximiately 35,000 registered
The DSP is an offshoot of the JSP when the party split
in 1960 and represents a mioderate form of socialism. It
generally represents a middle ground between the LDP and the
JSP. Supported chiefly by DOME I , the labor federation of
the automobile and shipping industries, the party represents
a nationally based rather than a worker based policy.
As regards national defense, the DSP favors the U.S. —
Japan Mutual Security Treaty with modifications to reflect a
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more balanced form of collective security. Although not
anti-American, the party wants the removal of U.S. troops
from the Japanese home islands.
It advised caution regarding future relations with the
People's Republic of China and promotes a policy of peaceful
coexistence v/ith all nations.
THE KOMEITO (CLEAN GOVERNMENT PARTY)
Membership ~ unknov/n, but the party claims 15-20 miillion
The Komeito is the political arm of the Soka Gakkai, a
religious lay society which is an offshoot of Nichiren Budd-
hism. Although its first involvement in partisan politics
came in 19 55, it did not become a ful].-fledged political
party until 1964. Only rem.otely resembling Buddhism, the
religious base of the party promises to offer a truly Japanese
alternative to the values and moralities of foreign ideolo-
gies, and is based upon the desire to reconstruct Japan under
the concept of Buddliist democracy. Despite its vague plat-
form, the Komeito is the miost cohesive, the best organized
and the most dogmatic of the political parties. Its leader-
ship is drawn di.rectly from the leadership of the religious
movement and, therefore, factionalism is virtually non-
existent. Its voting support is small because of a popular
fear of the organization's religious intolerance and its
authoritarian tendencies.
In the realm of foreign and defense policy, the Komeito
calls for neutralism., an immediate termination of the U.S. -
Japan Mutual Security Treaty, nuclear disarmament and a
universal system of collective security.

APPENDIX B
TREATY OF MUTUAL COQPER/.TIOM AND SECURITY
BETI^JEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AI^IERICAi^J AND JAPAN
The United States of America and Japan,
Desiring to strengthen the bonds of peace and friendship
traditionally existing betv/een them, and to uphold the prin-
ciples of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of lav/.
Desiring further to encourage closer economic cooperation
between them and to promote conditions of economic stab)ility
and well-being in their countries.
Reaffirming their faith in the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations, and their desire to
live in peace with all peopl-s and all governments.
Recognizing that they have the inherent right of indi-
vidual or collective self-defense as affirmed in the Charter
of the United Nations,
Considering that they have a comjnon concern in the main-
tenance of international peace and security in the Far East,
Having resolved to conclude a treaty of mutual coopera-
tion and security.
Therefore agree as follows:
ARTICLE I
The parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of
the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in
which tliey may be involved by peaceful m.eans in such a man-
ner that international peace and security and justice are
not endangered and to refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations
.
The Parties will endeavor in concert with other peace-
loving nations to strengthen the United Nations so that its
mission of maintaining international peace and security may




The Parties will contribute tov/ard the further develop-
ment of peaceful and friendly international relations by
strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a
better understanding of the principles upon which these
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of
stability and well being. They will seek to eliminate
conflict in their international economic policies and v/ill
encourage economic collaboration between them.
ARTICLE Til
The Parties, individually and in cooperation with each
other, by means of continuous and effective self-help and
mutual aid will maintain and develop, subject to their
constitutional provisions, their capacities to resist armed
attack.
ARTICLE IV
The Parties v/ill consult together from time to time
regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the
request of either Party, v;henever the security of Japan or
international peace and security in the Far East is
threatened.
ARTICLE V
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against
either Party in the territories under the adm.inistration of
Japan vv'ould be dangerous to its own peace and safety and
declares that it v/ould act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result
thereof shall be iiimiediately reported to the Security Council
of the United Nations in accordance v^ith the provisions of
Article 51 of the Charter. Such measures shall be terminated
when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary
to restore and maintain international peace and security.
ARTICLE VI
For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan
and the maintenance of international peace and security in
the Far East, the United States of America is granted use
by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas
in Japan,
The use of these facilities and areas as well as the
status of United States armed forces in Japan shall be
governed by a separate agreement, replacing the Administrative
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Agreement under Article III of the Security Treaty Betv/een
the United States of 7\raerican and Japan, signed at Tokyo on
February 28, 1952, as amended and by such other arrangements
as may be agreed upon.
ARTICLE VII
This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted
as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of the
Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the
responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security.
ARTICLE VIII
This Treaty shall be ratified by the United States of
American and Japan in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes and will enter into force on the
date on which the instruments of ratification thereof have
been exchanged by them in Tokyo.
ARTICLE IX
The Security Treaty between the United States of America
and Japan signed at the city of San Francisco on September 8,
1951 shall expire upon the entering into force of this Treaty.
ARTICLE X
This Treaty shall remain in force until in the opinions
of the Governments of the United States of AmLerican and Japan
there shall have come into force such United Nations arrange-
ments as will satisfactorily provide for the maintenance of
international peace and security in the Japan area.
However, after the Treaty has been in force for ten years,
either Party may give notice to the other Party of its inten-
tion to terminate the Treaty, in vv'hich case the Treaty shall
terminate one year after such notice has been given.
In WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries
have signed this Treaty.
Done in duplicate at Washington in the English and the
Japanese languages, both equally authentic, this 19th day of
January, 1960:









TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Entered into force March 5, 1970
The States concluding this treaty, hereinafter referred
to as the "Parties to the Treaty",
Considering the devastation that would be visited upon
all mankind by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make
every effort to avert the danger of such a war and to take
measures to safeguard the security of peoples,
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would
seriously enhance the danger of nuclear v;ar,
In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations
General Assembly calling for the conclusion of an agreement
on the prevention of wider dissemination of nuclear weapons,
Undertaking to cooperate in facilitating the application
of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on peaceful
nuclear activities,
Expressing their support for research, developm.ent and
other efforts to further the application, v/ithin the frame-
work of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards
system, of the principle of safeguarding effectively the
flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of
instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points,
Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful
applications of nuclear technology, including any techno-
logical by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapons
States from the developm.ent of nuclear explosive devices,
should be available for pe^iceful purposes to all Parties to
the Treaty, v.'hether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon
States
,
Convinced that, in furtherance of this principle, all
Parties to the Treaty are entitled to participate in the
fullest possible exchange of scientific information for,
and to contribute alone or in cooperation v.'ith other States
to, the further development of the applications of atomic
energy for peaceful purposes,
Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest
possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to
undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear
disarmament,
Urging the cooperation of all States in the attainment
of this objective.
Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to
the 19 6 3 Treaty banning nuclear weapons test in the atmos-
phere in outer space and under water in its Preamble to seek
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to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of
nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations
to this end.
Desiring to further the easing of international tension
and the strengthening of trust between States in order to
facilitate the. cessation of their manufacture of nuclear
weapons, the liquidation of a\ll their existing stockpiles,
and the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons
and the means of their delivery paramount to a treaty on
general and complete disarmament under strict and effective
international control,
Recalling that, in accordance v;it.h the Charter of the
United Nations, States m.ust refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the terri-
torial integrity or political independence of any States, or
in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the
United Nations, and that the establishment and miaintenance
of international peace and security are to be prom.oted with
the least diversion for armaments of the v7orld's human and
economic resources,
Have agreed as follows:
ARTICLE I
Each nuclear-v.-eapon State. Party to the Treaty undertakes
not to transfer to any recipient v/hatsoever nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such wea-
pons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not
in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-
weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over
such weapons or explosive devices.
ARTICLE II
Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty under-
takes not to receive the transfer from any transferer what-
soever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices
or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly
or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek
or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
ARTICLE III
1. Each non-nuclear-v;eapon State Party to the Treaty
undertakes to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement
to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic
Energy Agency in accordance with the Statute of the Inter-
national Atomic Energy 7\gency and the Agency's safeguard
system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the
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fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty
with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from
peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this
article shall be followed with respect to source of special
fissionable material vs^hether it is being produced, processed
or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any
such facility. The safeguards required by this article
shall be applied on all source or special fissionable mater-
ial in all peaceful nuclear activities v/ithin the territory
of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under
its control anywhere.
2. Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to
provide: (a) source or special fissionable material or
(b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful pur-
poses, unless the source or special fissionable material
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.
3. The safeguards required by this article shall be
implem.ented in a manner designed to comply with article IV
of this Treaty, and to avoid hampering the economic or tech-
nological development of the Parties or international coop-
eration in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including
the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment
for the processing, use or production of nuclear material
for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of
this article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in
the Preamble of the Treaty.
4. Non--nuclear-v,-'eapon States Party to the Treaty shall
conclude agreements with the International Atomic Energy
Agency to meet the requirem.ents of this article either
individually or together with other States in accordance
with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Negotiation of such agreements shall comonence within 180
days from, the original entry into force of this Treaty.
For States depositing their instruments of ratification or
accession after the 180 day period, negotiation of such
agreements shall commence not later than the date of such
deposit. Such agreements shall enter into force not later




1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the
Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.
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2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to facili-
tate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest
possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and
technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall
also cooperate in contributing alone or together v/ith other
States or international organizations to the further develop-
ment of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-
weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration
for the needs of the developing areas of the v;orld.
ARTICLE V
Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate
measures to ensure that, in accordance with this Treaty,
under appropriate international observation and through
appropriate international procedures, potential benefits
from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions \7ill be
made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis and that the charge to
such parties for the explosive devices used will be as low
as possible and exclude any charge for research and develop-
ment. Non-nuclear weapon States Party to the Treaty shall
be able to obtain such benefits, pursuant to a special inter-
national agreement or agreements, through an appropriate
international body witli adequate representation of non-nuclear-
weapon States. Negotiations on this subject shall commence
as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force.
Non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty so desiring
may also obtain such benefits pursuant to bilateral agreem.ents
.
ARTICLE VI
Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating
to cessation of the nuclear armtS race at an early date and




Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group
of States to conclude regional treati-s in order to assure




1. Any Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to
this Treaty. The texts of any proposed amendment shall be
submitted to the Depositary Governments which shall circulate
it to all Parties to the Treaty. Thereupon, if requested

to do so by one-third or more of the Parties to the Treaty,
the Depositary Governments shall convene a conference, to
which they shall invite all the Parties to the Treaty, to
consider such an amendment.
2. Any amendment to this Treaty must be approved by
a majority of the votes of all the Parties to the Treaty,
including the votes of all nuclear-weapon States Party to
the Treaty and all other Parties v/hich, on the date the
amendment is circulated, are members of the Board of Governors
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The amendment
shall enter into force for each Party that deposits its
instrument of ratification of the amendment upon the deposit
of such instrum.ents of ratification by a majority of all
the Parties, including the instruments of ratification of
all nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty and all other
Parties which, on the date the amendment is circulated, are
members of the Board of Governors of the International A^tomic
Energy A.gency. Thereafter, it shall enter into force for
any other Party upon the deposit of its instrument of ratifi-
cation of the amendment.
3. Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty,
a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in
Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of
this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purpose of the
Prearrble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.
At intervals of five years, thereafter, a majority of the
Parties to the Treaty may obtain, by subm.itting a proposal
to this effect to the Depositary Governments, the convening
of further conferences v/ith the same objective of reviewing
the operation of the Treaty.
ARTICLE IX
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signa-
ture. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its
entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this
article may accede to it at any time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by
signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instru-
ments of accession shall be deposited v;ith the Governments
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Island and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments
.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force after its ratifi-
cation by the States, the Governments of v;hich are designated
Depositaries of the Treaty, and forty other States signatory
to this Treaty and tlie deposit of their instruments of
126

ratification. For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear
weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a
nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to
January 1, 19 67.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification or
accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force
of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the
deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all
signatory and acceeding States of the date of each signature,
the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or
of accession, the date of the entry into force of this
Treaty, and the date of receipt of any requests for convening
a conference or other notices
.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary
Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the
United Nations.
ARTICLE X
1. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereign-
ty have the right to v/ithdraw from the Treaty if it decides
that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of
this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its
country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all
other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations
Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall
include a statem.ent of the extraordinary events if it regards
as having jeopardized its supreme interests.
2. Tv;enty-five years after the entry into force of the
Treaty, a conference shall be convened to decide whether the
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be
extended for an additional fixed period or periods. This
decision shall be taken by a majority of the Parties of the
Treaty.
ARTICLE XI
This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and
Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be
deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governm.ents
.
Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted
by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the
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